Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1987

Ed Cassity v. J. J. Castagno : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Unknown.
Franklin Riter; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Cassity v. Castagno, No. 8794.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1561

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

5.9

BRJEg

sA %

ED CASSITY,
^
Plaintiff and Appellant, 1
vs.

\ Case No. 8794

J. J. CASTAGNO,
1
Defendant and Respondent.]

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

FRANKLIN RITER

Attorney for Defendant
and Respondent,
Suite 312, Kearns Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
PART A
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT AND DEMONSTRATION
OF VALIDITY OF JUDGMENT

1, 2

3

POINT I.
WITH RESPECT TO THE LAND ACQUIRED BY DEFENDANT FROM
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY PATENT DATED DECEMBER 30, 1953, AND RECORDED IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY
RECORDER OF TOOELE COUNTY ON FEBRUARY 15, 1954, IN
BOOK F OF DEEDS AT PAGE 229, THE PLAINTIFF HAS ACQUIRED
NO TRAIL WAY EASEMENT OVER SAME IN SPITE OF THE FINDINGS THAT THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST HAD TRAILED CATTLE OVER AND ACROSS THE SAME
FOR A PERIOD OF TWENTY YEARS PRIOR TO MAY 3, 1955, AND
NEITHER DOES ANY PUBLIC HIGHWAY OR, ROAD EXIST OVER
DEFENDANT'S SAID LANDS
1. S t a t e m e n t of Facts
2. Citation of Authorities
(a) Private prescriptive right in t h e public domain
(b) Highways over public lands
3. Argument
.
(a) Private prescriptive right on public domain
(b) Highways over public lands

3
3
6
6
7
12
12
13

POINT II.
PLAINTIFF HAS ACQUIRED NO PRIVATE PRESCRIPTIVE TRAILWAY EASEMENT OVER DEFENDANT'S "HOMESTEAD PROPERTY," BEING THE LAND CONVEYED TO DEFENDANT BY THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY PATENT DATED FEB. 6, 1939,
AND RECORDED ON AUGUST 7, 1939, IN BOOK 3 Y AT PAGES
377, 378, AND NEITHER DID THERE EXIST A PUBLIC HIGHWAY
OVER DEFENDANT'S SAID LAND PRIOR TO PATENT
1. S t a t e m e n t of Facts
2. Citation of Authorities
3. Argument

16
16
17
18

POINT III.
PLAINTIFF HAS NEVER ACQUIRED THE RIGHT TO USE THE
WATER, WHICH DURJNG CERTAIN SEASONS OF THE YEAR ACCUMULATES ON DEFENDANT'S LAND SITUATE IN SECS. 9 AND
22. TWP. 2 SOUTH, RANGE 5 WEST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN
1. S t a t e m e n t of Facts
2. Constitutional and S t a t u t o r y Enactments
(1) If t h e water, which during certain seasons of t h e year
accumulates on defendant's lands in Section 9 and 22,
Twp. 2 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake B. and M. is in
t h e n a t u r e of either (a) waste or seepege water, or
(b) surface water, or (c) percolating water, a t no
time h a s it been n o r is it now subject to appropriations
and neither could a n y rights t h e r e t o be acquired by
prescription

19
19
21

21

I
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
(a) Waste w a t e r
(b) Surface w a t e r
(c) Percolating w a t e r
(2) At all times since May 11, 1903, t h e only m e t h o d by
which plaintiff could have acquired t h e right t o use
t h e w a t e r s which accumulates on defendant's lands in
Sections 9 and 22, Twp. 2 South, Range 5 West, Salt
Lake Base a n d Meridian, was by formal appropriation
of same as prescribed by t h e s t a t u t e s of t h e S t a t e of
Utah. The acquisition of rights to use w a t e r in U t a h
by prescription has been prohibited since said date
(a) Constitutional a n d S t a t u t o r y E n a c t m e n t s
(b) Judicial Decisions
,
(3) Argument
(a) The w a t e r s on defendant's land in Sees. 9 a n d
22 were not and are not subject to appropriation
or prescriptive user
(b) In t h e alternative, if it be adjudged t h a t t h e
waters on defendant's land in Sees. 9 and 22
have been and are w a t e r s subject to t h e law of
appropriation a n d prescription, t h e n t h e plaintiff
did not and could not acquire a prescriptive use
of same

21
29
30

32
33
36
44
44

50

PART B
ANALYSIS OF APPELLANT'S LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND DEMONSTRATION OF ERRORS IN ARGUMENT
56
(The points hereinafter setforth refer to t h e Points in Appellant's brief.)
Points I a n d II
56
Point III
56
Point IV
59
Point V
59
CONCLUSION
61
CITATION OF AUTHORITIES
(a) Judicial Decisions
Adams v. Town of Portage, 95 U t a h 1, 72 Pac. (2d) 648
43, 44
Ball v. Stephens, 68 Cal. App. 843, 158 Pac. (2d) 207
11, 15
Barber v. Anderson, 73 U t a h 375, 274 Pac. 136
60
Beck v. Jeppson, 1 U t a h (2d) 127, 262 Pac. (2d) 760
49
Berow et al. v. Shields, et ux., 48 U t a h 270, 159 Pac. 538
60
Binning v. Miller, 88 Wyo. 451, 102 Pac. (2d) 54
24
Bolton v. Murphy, 41 U t a h 591, 127 Pac. 335
7
Bountiful City v. DeLuca, 77 U t a h 107, 292 Pac. 194, 72 A.L.R. 657.... 43
Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 U t a h (2d) 226, 310 Pac. (2d) 517
49
B u r k h a r t v. Meiberg, 37 Colo. 187, 86 Pac. 98, 6 LRA (N.S.) 1104
23
Cincinnati v. White's Lessee, 6 Pet. 431, 8 L. Ed. 452
10
Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co., 17 U t a h 444,
54 Pac. 244
31, 47, 51
Deseret Livestock Co. v. Hooppiana,
66 U t a h 25, 239 Pac. 479
37, 38, 39, 40, 52, 53
Garn v. Rollins, 41 U t a h 260, 125 Pac. 867
27
II
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
H a m m o n d v. Johnson, 94 U t a h 20, 94 U t a h 35, 66 Pac. (2d) 894,
75 Pac. (2d) 164
42, 52, 53
Hatch Bros. Co. v. Black, 25 Wyo. 109, 165 Pac. 518, 25 Wyo. 416,
171 Pac. 267
11,14
J e r e m y v. Bertagnole, 104 U t a h 1, 116 Pac. (2d) 420
12
Klopensteine v. Hayes, 20 U t a h 45, 57 Pac. 712
49
Lasson v. Seeley, 120 U t a h 679, 238 Pac. (2d) 418
22
Leach v. Manhart, 102 Colo. 129, 77 Pac. (2d) 652
13
LeBrun v. Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 291 Pac. 825, 72 ALR 366
30
Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnes, 75 U t a h 384, 285 Pac. 646.. 12
Lovelace v. Hightower, 50 N.M. 50, 168 Pac. (2d) 50
9
Lund v. Wilcox, 34 U t a h 205, 97 Pac. 33
6
McKell v. Spanish Fork, 6 Utah (2d) 92, 305 Pac. (2d) 1097
30
McMonegal v. Fritsch Loan & Trust Co., 75 Utah 470, 268 Pac. 635
50
Morris v. Blunt, 49 U t a h 243, 161 Pac. 1127
12
Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 U t a h 475, 214 Pac. 313
50
O.S.L. R,d. Co. v. Murray City, 2 Utah (2d) 427, 277 Pac. (2d) 798.... 12
Petersen v. Cache County Drainage District, 77 U t a h 256,
294 Pac. 289
26
Public Utilities Commission v. Jones, 54 U t a h 111, 179 Pac. 745
9
Roberts v. Gribble, 43 Utah 411, 134 Pac. 1014
29
San Gabriel Valley Country Club v. Los Angeles County, 182 Cal.
392, 188 Pac. 554, 9 ALR 1200
29
Savage v. Nielsen, 114 U t a h 22, 197 Pac. (2d) 117
7
Sewards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 108 Pac. 212
55
Singleton v. Kelly, 61 U t a h 277, 212 Pac. 63
50
Smith Canal a n d Ditch Co. v. Colorado Ice & Storage Co., 34 Colo.
485, 82 Pac. 940, 3 LRA (N.S.) 1148
24
Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. v. Union Central Life Ins. Co.,
105 Utah 468, 142 Pac. (2d) 866, 113 Utah 356, 195 Pac. (2d)
249
22
Snyder v. Platte Valley Irrig. Co., 144 Neb. 308, 12 N.W. (2d) 160,
160 ALR 1164
30
Sullivan v. Condas, 76 U t a h 585, 290 Pac. 954
12
Sullivan v. N o r t h e r n Spy Mining Co., 11 U t a h 438, 40 Pac. 709,
55 ALR 1448
47, 55
Thompson v. Bingham, 78 Idaho 305, 302 Pac. (2d) 948
28
Tongue Creek Orchard Co. v. Town of Orchard City, 131 Colo. 177,
280 Pac. (2d) 46
25
Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 912, 69 ALR 1417
7
Weirick v. State, 140 Wis. 98, 121 N.W. 652, 22 LRA (N.S.) 1221
9
Wellsville East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay Land & L. Co., 104 U t a h 448,
137 Pac. (2d) 634
44, 53
Wendler v. Woodward, 93 Wash. 684, 161 Pac. 1043
55
Willow Creek Irrigation Co. v. Michaelson, 21 U t a h 248,
60 Pac. 943
32, 47, 51
(b) Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
Utah Constitution Art. XVII, Sec. 1
43 U.S.C.A. Sec. 932, USRS 2477

33
8,11,14,16

III
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
Laws of U t a h 1903, Chapter 100
Laws of U t a h 1905, Chap. 8
Comp. Laws of Utah 1907, Title 40, Chap. 2
Laws of U t a h 1911, Chap. 103
Comp. Laws of U t a h 1917, Title 55, Chap. 3, Sec. 3450
Laws of U t a h 1919, Chap. 67, Sec. 1
Revised S t a t u t e s of U t a h 1933, Title 100, Chap. 3, Sec. 100-3-1
Laws of U t a h 1935, Chap. 105, Sec. 100-3-1
Laws of U t a h 1939, Sec. 100-3-1
U t a h Code Ann. 1943, Sec. 100-1-1
U t a h Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 73-1-1

33,
33,
33,
33,
33,

(c) Text-Books and Encyclopedias, and Annotations
25 Am. Jur., Highways, Sec. 4, Page 340
25 Am. Jur., Highways, Sec. 5, Page 341
Elliott, Rpads and Streets, Vol. 1, Sec. 3, Page 4
25 Am. Jur., Highways, Sec. 2, Pages 339, 340
52 Am. Jur., Trespass, Sec. 49, Pages 873, 875
56 Am. Jur., Waters, Sec. 66, Pages 548, 549
Kinney on Irrigation (2d Ed.), Vol. 2, Sec. 661, Page 1151
F a r n h a m W a t e r Rights, Page 2572
Wiel on W a t e r Rights (3d Ed.), Vol. 1, Page 50
56 Am. Jur., Waters, Sec. 65, Pages 547, 548
J o n e s on Evidence (Ed. DeLuxe), Sec. 297
Wigmore's Code of Evidence, Rule 147, Page 259
Am. Jur., Pleading and Practice Forms—Estoppel ,Vol. 8, Page 181....

IV
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
34
34
34
35
35
35
36
36
36
36

8
8
8
12
57
21
27
26
27
29
58
58
60

xsi %

$Mt xA ptafy
ED CASSITY,
Plaintiff and Appellant, j
vs.

> Case No. 8794

J. J. CASTAGNO,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT
RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Special Interrogatories and Verdict Thereon.
The clerk of the trial court failed to include in the
Kecord of Appeal, the special interrogatories propounded
by the trial court to the jury, and the answers of the
jury thereto. However, Appellant in his brief, at pages
4, 5 and 6, has correctly transcribed and set forth said
interrogatories and answers. Notwithstanding the fact
that the original interrogatories and answers are not
included in the Record of Appeal, the Respondent hereby
approves of the action of Appellant in including the
same in his brief, and does hereby adopt such action in
lieu of the inclusion in the Record of Appeal of the
original interrogatories and answers.
1
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2. Plaintiffs Exhibit I.
Attention is particularly invited to "P Ex I," which
is a map upon which is delineated the respective ownerships of land of Appellant and Respondent involved in
this action. The holdings of Respondent in this area
which are of particular concern are as follows:
(a) The "Exchange property" acquired by Respondent by Patent, dated Dec. 30, 1953, from the
United States of America, and delineated upon
said exhibit in pink, bearing the numeral ' 5 " ;
(b) The "Homestead property" acquired by Respondent by Patent, dated February 6, 1939,
from the United States of America, and delineated upon said exhibit in pink, bearing the
numeral " 3 . "
Upon U P Ex I" is shown a lead pencil line commencing on the North boundary line of Section 23, Township 2 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Meridian, and
extending in a Northwesterly direction across the "Exchange" property and "Homestead" property of Respondent, and thence continuing in a Northwesterly
direction to Stansbury Island. This lead pencil marking
represents the so-called "Trailway" claimed by Appellant. It was placed upon "P Ex I " by the Appellant
at the trial (R. 67, 68, 69, 70).
3. Supplemental Evidence
For convenience, Respondent has included in the
argumentative portion of this brief such supplemental
evidence as he deems necessary for a proper determination of this case.
2
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Part A
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT AND
DEMONSTRATION OF VALIDITY OF JUDGMENT
POINT I.
WITH RESPECT TO THE LAND ACQUIRED BY DEFENDANT FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY
PATENT DATED DECEMBER 30, 1953, AND RECORDED
IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF TOOELE
COUNTY ON FEBRUARY 15, 1954, IN BOOK 4 F OF DEEDS
AT PAGE 229, THE PLAINTIFF HAS ACQUIRED NO TRAILWAY EASEMENT OVER SAME IN SPITE OF THE FINDINGS THAT THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS PREDECESSORS
IN INTEREST HAD TRAILED CATTLE OVER AND ACROSS
THE SAME FOR A PERIOD OF TWENTY YEARS PRIOR
TO MAY 3, 1955, AND NEITHER DOES ANY PUBLIC
HIGHWAY OR ROAD EXIST OVER DEFENDANT'S SAID
LANDS.
1. STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Defendant acquired the fee simple title to land delineated as "Pink 5" on Exhibit 1 by virtue of the Federal
patent above described on Dec. 30, 1953 (E. 118). This
land is particularly described as:
Wy 2 SWy4 and SE14 SW14, Sec. 4, Lots 6,
7, Ey 2 SWy4, Sec. 6, NWV4, SEy 4 , Wy 2 NE%,
SE% NEi/4, Sec. 9, SW14 SE%, NW% SW 1 ^,
Sec. 10; NW14, NWi/4 NE%, Ny2 SW*4, S W ^
SW%, Sec. 15; NW % NW% Sec. 15; NWV4
NWy4, Sec. 22.
(All of the foregoing is situate in Twp. 2
South, Eange 5 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian).
SE% Sec. 1, Twp. 2 South, Eange 6 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Prior to the date of the patent the lands described therein
were public domain owned by the United States of
America. The so-called trailway to and from Stansbury
3
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Island passes over and across the land above described
located in Twp. 2 South, Kange 5 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, with a compass direction from approximately the southeast to the northwest. The plaintiff definitely marked this position of this trailway on
P -Ex. I and there is evidence that the trallway deviated
from this course (R. 95).
Plaintiff's evidence was directed towards establishing a private trailway easement. It was intended to
support the allegations of plaintiff's supplemental complaint which claimed a private prescriptive easement
over defendant's lands as appurtenant to plaintiff's
lands. It is alleged:
"Plaintiff's cattle have during said period of
time trailed and crossed back and forth from the
approximately 5,700 acres of land which plaintiff
owns in said Township 2 South, Range 5 West,
to his other grazing lands located upon Stansbury
Island and said use in crossing, trailing and moving almost continually over and across the lands
by plaintiff and his predecessors in interest has
been open, under an adverse claim of right, known
and acquiesced in by defendant and his predecessors in interest, and has created by prescription an easement over and across all of said lands
within the above described area which are nob
owned by plaintiff, and which easement has become and is now the property right of plaintiff
in and to all said portions of land. That all of
said use by plaintiff and his predecessors in interest, have been an adverse use made with knowledge at all times of the owner of said lands
and without their consent and permission to said
use being made." (Underscoring supplied) ( P a r t I
of plaintiff's First Cross Claim and Counterclaim)

4
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There is no allegation in the Supplemental Complaint and no evidence in the record which even suggests
that plaintiff claimed that a public road existed over
defendant's lands prior to the date of patent thereof
in 1953. Plaintiff claimed by the allegations of his Supplemental Complaint and his evidence was given to prove
a private easement — not the existence of a public road.
There was no interrogatory propounded to the jury concerning the existence of a public road or highway. The
pertinent interrogatories a r e :
"9. Do you find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff and his predecessors
in ownership and possession drove or trailed their
cattle across defendant's lands in going to and
from Stansbury Island? (Answer yes or no).
Answer: 'Yes.'
"10. If your answer to No. 9 is yes, answer
the following questions:
A. Prior to May 3, 1955, did the plaintiff
and his predecessors in ownership and
possession regularly use the defendant's
lands for that purpose for 20 consecutive
years? (Answer yes or no).
Answer: 'Yes.'
B. Did the trail, if any, follow the same general course and direction during the 20
year period referred to in the next preceding question?
Answer: 'Yes.'"
The Court followed the theory of plaintiff's supplemental complaint and of plaintiff's evidence in propounding these interrogatories, and submitted to the
jury questions which pertained to facts relevant only
to the question whether a private prescriptive trailway
5
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easement appurtenant to plaintiff's lands as the dominant tenement, had come into existence. There was no
finding as to the existence of a pre-patent public highway or road over defendant's lands and neither did the
Court ask for any such finding for two valid reasons:
(a) plaintiff's supplemental complaint alleged no facts
upon which such claim could be based, and (b) there
is no evidence in the record supporting such claim.
2. CITATION OF A U T H O E I T I E S .
A. Private, prescriptive right in the Public
Domain.
"It is conceded that title to Appellants' land
remained in the United States until December,
1891. * * * This court has repeatedly held that
a prescriptive right in, to and over real estate
can be acquired only after an open, continuous
and adverse user for a period of 20 years. # # *
I t follows therefore that the time at which the
respondents alleged prescriptive right commenced
was in December 1891. This falls far short of
the period of time required to entitle respondent to a right of way over appellants' land by
prescription, and he must therefore fail upon
this ground." (Lund vs. Wilcox, 34 Utah 205;
97 Pac. 33)
"While there is no evidence in the record
showing when the patent was issued by the United
States in whom the original title was vested to
respondent's land, yet their counsel in their brief,
in referring to this subject at page 13, says:
'The Murphys (respondents) land was patented
in 1874.' We assume this to be the fact. If, therefore, no title passed from the government of the
United States to that of private ownership in
the year 1874, the right to acquire a private easement by user or prescription dates from that

6
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year. * * * If, therefore, we begin with the year
1875 the twenty year period would end with the
beginning of the year 1895." (Bolton v. Murphy,
41 Utah 591; 127 Pac. 335)
"It may be conceded that plaintiff is supported by the authorities in his contention that
an easement by prescription cannot be acquired
over land belonging to the State or the United
States, (10 C.J. Sees. 23, 24, pg. 876). Such has
been declared to be the law of this jurisdiction
as applied to land belonging to the United States.
(Bolton v. Murphy supra, Lund v. Wilcox supra).
The title to a part of plaintiff's land over which
the defendants claim the right to convey the
water with which to irrigate their land was conveyed by the United States to E. W. Tripp, the
predecessor of the plaintiff, in 1899. The title
to the other land over which the defendants claim
such right was conveyed by the State of Utah
in 1913. It will be thus seen that, if there was a
break in defendants' use of the irrigating ditches
across plaintiffs' land from 1907 to 1917 the defendants could not acquire an easement by prescription across plaintiffs' land because there
could not be a continuous use for a period of
20 years. As to the land conveyed to plaintiff
by the State of Utah in 1913, obviously a prescriptive easement could not be acquired up to
1922 when this suit was begun." (Tripp v. Baglev,
74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 912; 69 ALR 1417).
"It is well established as the rule in Utah
that the prescriptive period is twenty years as
it was at the common law (citing Utah Supreme
Court decision.) (Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah
22; 197 Pac. (2d) 117 at 122).
B. Highways Over Public Lands.
"The right of way for the construction of
highways over public lands, not reserved for pub

7
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lie use, is hereby granted." (USES 2477; 43 USCA
Sec. 932).
"Highways are distinguished from private
roads or ways in that the former are intended
for the use of the public generally and are maintained at public expense, as already noted, while
the latter are intended for the exclusive use and
benefit of particular persons. Giving a private
way a name does not make it a public highway
or thoroufare." (25 Am. Jur., Highways, Sec.
4, pg. 340)
"The term 'highway' is, however, used in both
a broad and narrow sense. In its broad or general
sense, it covers every common way for travel in
any ordinary mode or by any ordinary means
which the public has the right to use conditionally
or unconditionally. * * * In a limited sense, howTever, the term means a way for general travel
which is wholly public. When appearing in a
general law, it will ordinarily be regarded as
having been used by the legislature in its general
sense. * * *" (25 Am. Jur., Highways, Sec. 5,
pg. 341)
" / / a way is one over which the public have
a general right of passage, it is in legal contemplation a highway, whether it be one owned by
a private corporation or one owned by the government, or a governmental corporation, and whether
it be situated in a town or in the country. No
matter whether it be established by prescription
or by dedication, or under the rights of eminent
domain, it is a highway if there is a general right
to use it for travel. The mode of its creation does
not of itself invariably determine its character:
for this in general, is determined by the rights
which the public have in it. (Underscoring supplied) (Elliott, Roads and Streets, Vol. 1, Sec.
3,pg.4).

8
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"In order to constitute a particular road or
highway a public road and the traffic and travel
thereon subject to regulation and control by the
Commission the question is not whether the county
or state has acquired an indefeasible title, easement, or right of way, but the question is whether
the particular road or highway is being used by
the public generally for travel and traffic and is
claimed by the public as a public road or highway, and as such is being used for the purpose
of hauling and transporting freight and passengers over it for hire or private gain by those
owning and using the ordinary and usual vehicles
used on public highways for such purpose. Any
road or highway which is thus being used by the
public generally is, in my judgment, a public
road or highway within the purview of the law,
over which the travel and traffic is subject to
regulation by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied.) (Justice Frick in Public Utilities Commission v. Jones, 54 Utah 111, 179 Pac. 745)
"The term 'public highway' in its broad,
popular sense includes toll roads, — any road
which the public have a right to use even conditionally, though in a strict legal sense, it is
restricted to roads which are wholly public."
(Weirick vs. State, 140 Wis. 98, 121 NW 652,
22 LRA (N.S.) 1221)
"The word 'highway' as ordinarily used
means a way over land open to the use of the
general public without unreasonable distinction
or discrimination, established in a mode by the
laws of the State where located." (Lovelace v.
Hightower, 50 N.M. 50; 168 Pac. (2nd) 50).
"The federal statute involved is as follows:
'The right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public
uses is hereby granted.' This is an offer to dedi9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cate any unreserved public lands for the construction of highways to become effective # * *.
It is a general rule that acceptance of an offered
dedication of land for a highway may be established by proof of affirmative acts of taking pos«
session by public authorities or by general use
by the public, provided the use is sufficient to
constitute acceptance. (Citing authorities). The
Supreme Court of the United States has said
that such uses 'ought to be for such length of
time that the public accommodation and private
rights might be materially affected by an interruption of the enjoyment.'" (City of Cincinnati
vs. White's Lessee, 6 Pet. 431, 8 L.Ed. 452. * * *.
"The United States as a land owner has
made an offer to dedicate unappropriated land for
highways, if accepted as authorized by this state's
law. The easement for its use as a public highway
was created exactly as those (of which) the dedicator was an individual land owner. If mere public user is sufficient acceptance of an offered
dedication, the ten year statute of limitations
is not remotely applicable. * * * The courts of
a majority of the states which have had the
question for consideration have held that the
general rules applies to the offered dedication of
highways under the Federal statute involved here.
(Citing authorities) (Lovelace v. Hightower,
supra)
"The cause of action upon which plaintiff
prevailed herein upon a finding that the road is
a public highway was not the same cause of action
as the one in the former action which alleged his
ownership of a private right of way. The proof
that would have established one cause of action
would not have established the other. The causes
of action were in fact inconsistent, since defendant could not have sold and plaintiff could not
have purchased, a private right of way over a
10
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public road. Moreover, a different title was involved in each case, the first a private title, and
the other a title vested in the public. * * * The
question of the public character of the road was
not in issue in the first case and the issue was
not tried. A decision either way as to the private
right claimed would not have determined any
question as to the public right." (Emphasis supplied) (Ball v. Stephens, 68 Cal. App. 843, 158
Pac. (2nd) 207).
"The grant (K.S. 2477, 43 U S . CA 932,
supra) is unconditional and contains no provision
as to the manner of its acceptance. We think it
quite well settled that when land is granted for
a right of way for a public highway, the grant
may be accepted by the public without action by
the public authorities. The continued use of the
road hy the public for such length of time and
under such circumstances as to clearly indicate
an intention on the part of the public to accept
the grant has generally been held sufficient more
especially so if it is made to appear that to interrupt the use would "inconvenience the public/'
It must be born in mind that it is not a question
of the establishment of a highway by prescription
which is here in question, but the acceptance of a
grant; and therefore it does not depend so much
on a definite length of time of use as upon the
character of the use, taking into account the needs
and convenience of the public, as manifesting an
intention to accept the grant. (Emphasis supplied) (Hatch Bros. Co. v. Black, 25 Wyo. 109,
165 Pac. 518) (Cf: on rehearing, 25 Wyo. 416,
171 Pac. 267)
"A highway is a way open to the public at
large, for travel or transportation, without distinction, discrimination or restriction, except such
as is incident to regulations calculated to secure
to the general public the largest practical benefit
11
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therefrom and enjoyment thereof. Its prime essentials are the right of common enjoyment on
the one hand and the duty of public maintenance
on the other. It is the right of travel by all the
world, and not the exercise of the right, which
constitutes a way, a public highway, and the actual
amount of travel upon it is not material. If it is
open to all who desire to use it it is a public
highway although it may accomodate only a limited portion of the public or even a single family,
and although it accommodates some individuals
more than others." (Emphasis supplied) (25
Am. Jur. Highways — Sec. 2, Pgs. 339, 340)
Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnes, 75
Utah 384, 285 Pac. 646
Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 Pac. 954
Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 Pac. (2nd)
420
O.S.L. Ed. Co. vs. Murray Citv, 2 Utah (2nd)
427, 277 Pac. (2nd) 798
Leach v. Manhart, 102 Colo. 129, 77 Pac. (2nd)
652
"Use under private right is not sufficient. If
the thoroughfare is laid out or used as a private
way, its use, however long as a private way does
not make it a public way. Use under private use
is not sufficient * * * and the mere fact that
the public make use of it without objection from
the owner of the land will not make it a public
way. Before it becomes public in character the
owner of the land must consent to the change.
(Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 Pac. 1127)
3.

AKGUMENT
A. Private
Domain

Prescriptive

Rights

on

Public

The uncontroverted facts in this case absolutely
deny plaintiff any private trailway easement over, upon
12
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or across lands of defendant above described. Any use
of these lands by plaintiff and predecessors in title while
the lands were part of the public domain cannot, of
course, be considered in determining the existence of a
private prescriptive right. (See authorities cited above.)
Plaintiff commenced the present action on May 28, 1955,
by filing his complaint in the office of the Clerk of the
Court. He served and filed his answer to defendant's
cross complaint and his supplemental complaint setting
up his alleged private prescriptive right to a trailway
easement over said lands on January 6, 1956. The Federal patent is dated Dec. 30, 1953, and was recorded Feb.
15, 1954 (E. 118). If plaintiff is allowed the benefit of
the January 6, 1956 date (date of filing his supplemental complaint) instead of May 28,1955 (date of filing
his original complaint), the expired time after issuance of
Federal patent during which plaintiff used defendant's
said lands is not more than 1 year, 10 months and 21 days
(time between date of recording patent—Feb. 15, 1954—
and date of filing supplemental complaint—January 6,
1956). If the period is computed from date of Federal
patent (Dec. 30,1953) to date of filing supplemental complaint (January 6,1956), the result is 2 years and 6 days.
In either of said methods it is clearly obvious that plaintiff has failed in his proof of a prescriptive user of 20
years or more. The facts and the law, as enunciated by
the cited authorities, require judgment in defendant's
favor on this facet and theory of the case.
B.

Highways

Over Public

Lands

Plaintiff's cause of action as set forth in his Supplemental Complaint alleged facts upon which a claim for a
13
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private prescriptive way could be based. I t is self evident from the allegations set forth above that the pleader's theory was that plaintiff had acquired by over twenty
years continuous adverse user a private prescriptive
trail way over defendant's lands appurtenant to plaintiff's land located in the area. This claim is defeated by
the law and facts of the case as above demonstrated. An
examination of plaintiff's evidence shows it was given in
support of these allegations and of plaintiff's theory of
this case. There is not a suggestion or implication in
plaintiff's evidence that the general public was interested
or had ever used the alleged trailway. He claimed and his
evidence was directed to prove that he and his predecessors in interest claimed a private right over defendant's
lands. The defendant met this evidence by counter-posing
evidence and the Court based his interrogatories on plaintiff's theory (Interrogatories 9 and 10). This aspect of
the case was tried on the issue whether a private prescriptive easement existed over defendant's lands, and not
on any other theory.
The authorities above cited definitely differentiate
between (a) a private easement acquired by prescription,
and (b) a user by the public of sufficient substance as to
indicate an acceptance by the public of the offer by the
United States under K.S. 2477 (43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 932).
It is appropriate to repeat here the admonition of the
Wyoming Supreme Court in Hatch Bros. Co. v. Black,
supra:
"It must be borne in mind that it is not a question of the establishment of a highway by prescription which is here in question, but the acceptance of a grant ***"
14
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It will be a vain search of the trial record to attempt to discover even a scintilla in evidence which will
support a finding that prior to patent issuance to defendant a public highway existed over defendant's land.
Such evidence is simply not in the record. Evidence supporting a claim for a private prescriptive easement will
not prove the existence of a public highway. Each claim
is separate from the other and in fact antagonistic. The
Court of Civil Appeals of California pointed up the
distinction in Ball v. Stephens supra, and the excerpt
quoted from that decision is not only pertinent to the
situation in this case, but decisively answers any argument which plaintiff might present to support a claim
that defendant took title to his lands under the 1953
patent burdened by public highway or road. Plaintiff
in his supplemental complaint never claimed that there
existed a "pre-patent" highway under E.S. 2477. His
entire effort in his pleading and at the trial was to claim
and prove a private trailway easement.
Any argument in support of the "public highway"
theory in this case fails to find support both in the evidence and in the law. If this action be treated as a law
action, then there is no finding by the jury as to the
existence of a pre-patent public highway. The failure of
the court to submit an interrogatory on this question is
no fault of the court. It would have been error on its
part to have done so inasmuch as plaintiff's pleadings
and his evidence are based alone on the private prescriptive right theory. Neither did plaintiff request the
Court to propound an interrogatory on the question of
the existence of a pre-patent public highway. His perti15
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nent requested interrogatories do not contain the words
"public highway." They pertain only to private prescriptive rights. The "public highway" theory was not advanced at trial even by way of argument and certainly
not by the pleadings or evidence. If this action be treated
as one in equity the "public highway" theory fails because there is no evidence to support the finding of the
pre-patent public user under R.S. 2477. The Court would
commit gross error in making such a finding. Plaintiff,
by means of his pleadings and evidence, lulled both the
defendant and the Court into the belief that he was relying only on the private prescriptive right theory. The
pre-patent "public highway" theory and argument comes
too late to be available to plaintiff. Beyond all peradventures defendant is entitled to judgment in his favor
on this facet of the case.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF HAS ACQUIRED NO PRIVATE PRESCRIPTIVE TRAILWAY EASEMENT OVER DEFENDANT'S
"HOMESTEAD PROPERTY/' BEING THE LAND CONVEYED TO DEFENDANT BY THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA BY PATENT DATED FEB. 6, 1939, AND RECORDED ON AUGUST 7, 1939, IN BOOK 3 Y AT PAGES 377,
378, AND NEITHER DID THERE EXIST A PUBLIC HIGHWAY OVER DEFENDANT'S SAID LAND PRIOR TO PATENT.

1. STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Defendant acquired the fee simple title to land delineated as "Pink 2" on Exhibit P Ex. I by virtue of
Federal patent dated February 6, 1939, and recorded on
August 7, 1939 (R. 170). The land is particularly described as:
16
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N W % SE14 and SW*4 N E % of Sec. 15, Twp. 2
South, Eange 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
This land also was part of the public domain owned by
the United States of America prior to the date of the
patent. I t was acquired by defendant under the Federal
Homestead Law, and is for convenience designated herein as ("Homestead" lands). Plaintiff has pleaded a
private trailway easement over this "homestead" land
(See Par. I, pg. 2 of his Supplemental Complaint) and
attempted proof of facts in the endeavor to establish such
private prescriptive trailway easement. This alleged
private trailway easement represents the southeastern
portion of the same trailway claimed b yplaintiff over the
lands of defendant particularly described in Point I of
this brief. The alleged trailway over the "homestead"
lands is the initial portion of the alleged "Stansbury
Island" trailway ( P Ex. I ) . Plaintiff's pleading and
evidence were solely directed toward claiming and proving a private trailway easement over the "homestead"
lands. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record
with respect to the existence of a pre-patent "public
highway." Plaintiff requested no interrogatory on the
question of the existence of a pre-patent public highway
and the Court propounded none. Plaintiff's relevant
pleading on this issue is quoted verbatim in Point I of
this brief. There is no finding by the jury as to the
existence of a pre-patent "public highway" over and
across the "homestead" lands.
2. CITATION O F A U T H O E I T I E S .
See authorities cited in Point I, 2, supra of this
brief.
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3. ARGUMENT.
Again plaintiff fails in establishing a private prescriptive easement over and across defendant's lands last
above described. The homestead patent in defendant's
favor was dated February 6,1939, and was recorded August 7, 1939 (R. 170). Plaintiff filed his Supplemental
Complaint alleging his right to a trailway easement over
said land on January 6, 1956. The expired time is therefore 16 years, 4 months and 29 days. If the date of the
patent is taken as the starting point (Feb. 6,1939) to date
of filing Supplemental Complaint Jan. 6, 1956, the expired time is 16 years, and 11 months. Obviously neither
of said computations yields a period of prescriptive user
short of the required 20 years. The period of use of the
defendant's lands by plaintiff and predecessors when
title to same was in the United States cannot be and is
not counted in determining the time of adverse user.
(See authorities cited in Point I supra). In the first
instance it is 3 years, 7 months and 1 day short. In the
second instance it is 3 years and 1 month deficient.
Tinder the law and the facts defendant is entitled to
judgment of Court quieting his title as to said land
against plaintiff's pretended claim of a private prescriptive right over defendant's "homestead" lands.
The pre-patent "public highway" theory is as equally inapplicable to defendant's "homestead" lands as it
is to the lands of defendant described in Point I of this
brief. The legal authorities and argument hereinbefore
submitted against the adoption of said theory are restated
and reaffirmed as to defendant's "homestead" lands.
Manifestly defendant is entitled to judgment in this
18
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action denying the existence of a pre-patent "pubic highway" over his "homestead" lands.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF HAS NEVER ACQUIRED THE RIGHT TO
USE THE WATER, WHICH DURING CERTAIN SEASONS
OF THE YEAR ACCUMULATES ON DEFENDANT'S LAND
SITUATE IN SECS. 9 AND 22, TWP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 5
WEST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN.

1.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

The pertinent findings by the jury relative to this
phase of the case are found in response to the prepounding of the following interrogatories :
"11—Do you find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff and his predecessors in
ownership used the lands of the defendant in Sections 9 and 22, Twp. 2 South, Eange 5 West and
the water holes, if any, upon said lands to water
his cattle for a period of 20 consecutive years prior
to May 31,1955: Answer: Yes.
"12—If your answer to No. 11 is yes, answer
the following question:
" F o r how many consecutive years prior to
May 31, 1955, has the plaintiff and his predecessors in ownership used said lands and water
holes? Answer: 50 years."
There are no jury findings as to the origin of the water
nor its quantity, nor the nature and size of the deposit of
water nor whether it was and is produced as a result of
m a n o r as a natural accumulation, nor as to the frequency
or infrequency of its accumulation on the said lands. The
interrogations assumed the existence of water on said
lands in "water holes." I t is therefore necessary to consider the evidence introduced at the trial. There is a
high degree of conflict in the evidence. The evidence of
19
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the defendant denies the presence of water, and the existence of "water holes" (E. 18, 22). At the most, these are
low places which are "bogs" or mud holes during most
seasons of the year (R. 23). According to defendant,
the "bog" or mud hole in Sec. 9 was "dynamited" in 1938
or 1939 and since that time there has been no sign of
water (R. 191). Defendant has never seen plaintiff's
cattle drink at any "hole" on said section, but rather
they went to adjacent flowing wells to drink (R. 19, 23).
There were and are no live streams or springs on said
sections. Examination of said lands was made in 1945
by witnesses in connection with defendant's "exchange"
transaction with the United States. These witnesses
testified in substance that there were no "water holes"
as the term is ordinarily used nor were there live streams
or springs on the land. On one of the sections there was
a low place or "bog" but it contained little if any water.
Plaintiff testified "water holes" existed in said sections and cattle drank from same (R. 64, 65, 88). The
water stands in the holes and does not flow out on the
lands (R. 84). There are four small holes on Sec. 9 (R.
83). They hold water the year long—water fit for cattle
to drink (R. 85). Cattle have used them for years during
all months of the year. The so called "water holes" are
in truth but cow tracks which during certain seasons of
the year fill with water (R. 86, 88). Water does not flow
off in a channel (R. 87). Pierre Castagno testified in
the summer of 1952 there was water in the "hole" on
Sec. 9 sufficient to water 30 or 40 horses and that in the
spring of the year there is sufficient water in the "holes"
to water 20 or 30 head of cattle (R. 255). Tony Castagno
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testified there are "water holes" on said sections, which
contain water during all times of the year and in amount
sufficient to water cattle. They are never completely
dried up (E. 295). Eose Castagno stated there are three
water holes on land "north of the old homestead" (E.
304). None of them ever died up and they contained
water at all times of drinkable quality (E. 304). Keith
Wanless testified there are water holes on said sections
and water is of such quantity and quality as to be drinkable (E. 308, 310). Water was in the "holes" in 1956 sufficient to water cattle (E. 310, 311). Twenty-five cows
could water at those "holes" (E. 317).
Included in the presentation of the Argument, hereinafter contained, reference is made to other testimony
in the case.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTOEY ENACTMENTS.
(1) / / the water, which during certain seasons of
the year accumulates on defendant's lands in Section 9
and 22, Twp. 2 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake B. and
M. is in the nature of either (a) waste or seepage water,
or (b) surface water, or (c) percolating water, at no
time has it been nor is it now subject to appropriation
and neither could any rights thereto be acquired by prescription. (56 Am. Jur.—Waters—Sec. 66, Pgs. 548, 549).
A. Waste Water
«### rpj^ o w n e r 0 f a w a t e r right, after diversion from the stream is the owner and entitled to
the water itself, the corpus of the water as long as
he retains it in his ditches and reservoirs on his
property and under his control # # * As long as the
water is under the control of the appropriator in
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his land or in his ditches or reservoirs or other
things owned and controlled by him, it is still his
water and he may use it in any lawful place or
for any lawful use he chooses, or may lease and
sell it. ***" (Smithfield West Bench Irrigation
Co. v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 105 Utah 468,
142 Pac. (2nd) 866, 871; also 113 Utah 356, 195
Pac. (2nd) 249.)
"However in the absence of such a statute it
is generally held that such waste of water and
seepage cannot be appropriated * * * The
plaintiff apparently bases its claim to the exclusive right to the use of this waste water whenever
it is available upon the fact that it has been using
such waste water for a long period of time without
interruption. However, I do not believe that an
exclusive right to the use of the waste water can
be acquired in this manner." (Justice Wolfe in
Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. v. Union
Central Life Ins. Co., supra, and particularly at
pg. 871 of 149 Pac. (2nd).
See also: Lasson v. Seeley, 120 Utah 679, 238
Pac. (2nd) 418.
"The question for decision is whether the
plaintiff has made a valid appropriation of waste
water as against the defendants, or whether the
defendants have a right, as against plaintiff, to
intercept upon their own land, and before it
passes therefrom, water which has been spread
upon the same, but not entirely consumed, in the
process of irrigation. It will be observed from
the foregoing statement that it is only to such
water as has actually escaped from defendants,
and reached her own lands that plaintiff makes
claim. *** It is manifest that, as against the defendants, the plaintiff has not made a valid appropriation of this alleged waste water. Just
what constitutes waste water in every instance
we do not decide, but it is unquestionably true,
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so far as concerns the right to make a valid appropriation of it, this water is not waste water
so long as it remains upon the lands of the defendants, and does not, in any event, become such until
it has escaped and reached the lands of others.
The plaintiff certainly has acquired no vested
right to compel the defendants to apply the waters,
the right to the use of which they own, in such a
way as that some of it will not soak into their
own ground, but escape and pass from the surface
onto her lands. # # # So long as, and while, the water
which is applied by defendants to the irrigation
of their lands remains upon the same, it is, as
against the plaintiff, their exclusive property,
whatever may be the rights of plaintiff as against
some other claimant to it as waste water." (BurJcart v. Meiberg, 37 Colo. 187, 86 Pac. 98, 6 L E A
(NS) 1104.)
"Defendant's case, both by pleading and evidence, is that these waters did not constitute
springs or natural water courses, but percolated
through, and by artificial means had been collected into bodies or artificial springs on defendant
Baker's own land, which by artificial surface
channels flowed into plaintiff's canal, and was,
with his consent, used by plaintiff only when he
did not choose to use the same for his own lawful purposes, which he often did. # # # The trial
court found, in accordance with the defendants'
claim, that these waters originally existed as
percolating waters in defendant Baker's land, and
by artificial means were developed and collected
by him into artificial basins in the semblance of
springs, and as such, therefore, belonged to him,
as an integral part of his own land, which ownership has never been divested. # # # The law, under
the facts, makes these waters, arising, as they
do, on defendant Baker's lands, whether they be
artificially collected percolating waters or the
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waters of a natural flowing stream or spring, his
property, as against the plaintiff in this case, unless the latter has acquired them in some way
known to the law. *** And it is of no consequence
here whether they are natural springs arising on
the defendant's lands or have been intercepted
as percolating waters and artificially collected.
"The doctrine of appropriation, as understood in the arid states, may or may not, under
the facts of the case, apply to these waters. That
we need not decide, for it is clear that, according
to the findings, the plaintiff has not made a valid
appropriation. *** I t is also equally clear that
no right by prescription or adverse use has been
established, for the findings were that whenever
defendant Baker wished to use these waters for
his own domestic purposes, for irrigating lands,
or for filling fish ponds, or for sale as merchandise, or otherwise, he did so under claim of ownership." (Smith Canal and Ditch Co. v. Colorado Ice
& Storage Co., 34 Colo. 485, 82 Pac. 940, 3 L E A
(N.S.) 1148.)
"It is probably safer, for the benefit of all,
and for the sake of stability of water rights, to declare definitely that an appropriation of seepage
water is void. Of course, if a party has once obtained possession of such water, and another party
not entitled thereto should attempt to deprive him
thereof, the possessor would doubtless have a
cause of action. Wiel, supra, Sec. 55. But that
is not the situation here. The intervener wanted
to get possession, and sues because Binning prevented him from getting it." (Binning v. Miller,
88. Wyo. 451; 102 Pac. (2nd) 54, at pg. 62).
"Likewise, in Kinney on Irrigation, 2nd Ed.,
volume 2, page 1151, Section 661, is the following:
'Authorities hold that while the water,
so denominated as waste water, may be used
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after it escapes, no permanent right can be
acquired to have the discharge kept up, either
by appropriation, or a right by prescription,
estoppel, or acquiescence in its use while it is
escaping, and that, too, even though expensive ditches or works were constructed for
the purpose of utilizing such waste water,
unless some other element enters into the
condition of affairs, other than the mere use
of the water. In other words, the original appropriators have the right, and in fact it is
their duty to prevent, as far as possible, all
waste of the water which they have appropriated, in order that the others who are entitled thereto may receive the benefit thereof.'
Also, section 662, at page 1153:
'After water has been appropriated and
diverted from a natural stream into ditches,
canals, or other artificial works, it becomes
personal property and cannot be appropriated from such works.'
"There is no obligation upon an owner to continue to maintain conditions so as to supply water
to appropriators of waste water at any time or
in any quantity when acting in good faith."
{Tongue Creek Orchard Co. v. Town of Orchard
City, 131 Colo. 177, 280 Pac. (2nd) 426, 428.)
"Neither the rule of reasonable use nor the
rule of correlative rights has any application to
percolating water which is the result of the landowner irrigating his land. The rules are limited
in their application to such water as percolates
through the soil from natural causes. If a landowner conveys water onto his premises by artificial irrigation and thereby causes water to percolate through his land and into adjoining land, the
owner of the adjoining land does not acquire a
vested right to have the water continue to so
percolate through his land. A landowner may
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irrigate or fail to irrigate his land, and, although
by irrigation a benefit is conferred upon an adjoining landowner, such benefit may be withheld
at pleasure. Percolating water resulting from the
irrigation of one's own land may be recovered
and used by the owner before it leaves his land
without invading any right of an adjoining landowner." (Petersen v. Cache County Drainage District, 77 Utah 256, 294 Pac. 289, 291.)
"It is sufficient to here state, without approving or disapproving the doctrine of the reasonable
use rule, that the facts as found by the court do
not bring the case within that rule. The seepage
or percolating water here involved is created by
the artificial irrigation of appellant's land. True,
as a result of this irrigation, the water sinks,
seeps, and percolates into the soil of appellant's
land and saturates it for a depth of several feet;
it, nevertheless, is nothing more in fact and in
law than surface or waste water. *** The law
is well settled, in fact the authorities all agree,
that one landowner receiving waste water which
flows, seeps, or percolates from the land of another cannot acquire a prescriptive right to such
water, nor any right (except by grant) to have
the owner of the land from which he obtains the
water continue the flow. The general rule regarding the right of the owner of land to surface water
therein is stated by Mr. Farnham, in his work on
Water Rights (page 2572), as follows: 'There is
no right on the p a r t of a lower appropriator to
have surface water flow to his land from upper
property. The owner of the soil on which it falls
has an absolute right to it, and may do with it
what he pleases. And the fact that surface water
has flowed from the land of one man onto that
of another for more than 20 years will not prevent
the former from draining his land so as to cut off
the flow.'
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"In 1 Wiel on Water Rights (3d Ed.) p. 50,
the author says: 'While artificial flow claimants
may thus have priorities between themselves, they
can have no right of continuance against the owner of the natural supply (the appropriator on the
natural stream ***), except by grant, condemnation, or dedication (or by rule of compulsory service where the water is distributed to public use).
The chief instance of artificial flows in practice
is where some stream owner has carried water
to a distance and, after use, discharges it below
his land or works. *** Seeing the water come
down, other parties arrive, build ditches below,
receive the water, and put it to use. Yet unless
they have a contract with the stream owner, they
must generally rely upon continued receipt from
him of such water at their peril. In such case the
creator of this artificial flow may cease to allow
it to escape.' And on page 52 it is said: "In the
absence of contract, the natural water-right owner
may cease the abandonment of waste from a ditch,
and so use the water that none of it thereafter
runs waste, or so that it runs off in a new place
where people below no longer can get it. Long
receipt by them of the water of itself gives no
permanent right to have the discharge continued,
whether by appropriation, prescription, or estoppel, even though the lower claimants built expensive ditches or flumes to catch the waste.'
Numerous decisions are cited by the author in a
note to the text which illustrate and support this
doctrine. And again on page 54 it is said: 'Waste
water soaking from the land of another after irrigation need not be continued, and may be intercepted and taken by such original irrigator, and
conducted elsewhere, though parties theretofore
using the waste are deprived thereof.' (Gam v.
Rollins, 41 Utah 260, 125 Pac. 867, 871, 872.)
"It is a rule long recognized that a landowner
cannot acquire a prescriptive right to the con-
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tinued flow of waste or seepage water from the
land of another, that is, seepage water or waste
water running from one's land to that of another
need not be continued and it may be intercepted
and taken by such owner at any time and used on
the land to which it is appurtenant.
'No valid appropriation can be made or
prescriptive right acquired by gathering surplus water as it flows over the surface from
adjoining property upon which it has been
spread for irrigation purposes, or by merely
accepting and using water when it is allowed
to flow into one's ditch by the original owner,
who makes exclusive use of it whenever he
chooses to do so.' 30 Am. J u r . 611, Sec. 19.
"The original appropriator may at any time
recapture waste water remaining on his land and
apply it to a beneficial use. Barker v. Sonner, 135
Or. 75, 294 P. 1053; Sebern v. Moore, 44 Idaho 410,
258 P . 176; Reynolds Irrigation Co. v. Sproat,
70 Idaho 217, 214 P. 2d 880.
"Hence, as against the original appropriator
and owner, an adjoining land owner cannot acquire a prescriptive right to waste or seepage
water." (Thompson v. Bingham, 78 Idaho 305, 302
Pac. (2nd) 948, 949.
"We think the evidence both for appellants
and respondent tends to show that the waters in
dispute are seepage and percolating waters. These
waters rose in such quantities on respondent's
land that it became submerged and was rendered
unfit for the raising of hay and other farm products. The respondent undoubtedly had a right to
drain his land of the water and put it in a condition for raising crops. Whether he did this by
sinking wells or by digging drain ditches was
of no concern to appellants. The water thus de28
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veloped or collected being waste water which seeps
and percolates into respondent's land from adjoining lands, he had the legal right to make whatever beneficial use of it he deemed proper, and he
did not invade any right of appellant's by so doing.
We think the right to the use of the water in this
case comes squarely within the rule announced in
the case of Garns v. Eollins, 125 Pac. 867, recently
decided by this court." {Roberts v. Gribble, 43
Utah 411, 134 Pac. 1014, 1016.)
B. Surface Water
"The term 'surface water' is used in the law
of waters in reference to a distinct form or class
of water which is generally defined as that which
is derived from falling rain or melting snow, or
which rises to the surface in springs, and is diffused over the surface of the ground while it remains in such diffused state or condition. I t is
thus distinguished from water flowing in a natural
water course or collected into and forming a definite and identifiable body, such as a lake or pond.
In some instances the courts have classed as surface waters such as lie or spread over the surface,
or percolate the soil, as in swamps and do not flow
in any particular direction." (56 Am. J u r . —
Waters—Sec. 65, pgs 547, 548.)
"(Surface) waters, in a legal sense are those
which fall on the land, by precipitation from the
skies, or arise in springs and spread over the surface of the ground without being collected into a
definite body. McDaniel v. Cummings, 83 Cal.
515; 8 L.E.A. 575, 23 Pac. 795; 3 Farnham Waters,
Sec. 278." (San Gabriel Valley Country Club v.
Los Angeles County, 182 Cal. 392, 188 Pac. 554,
9 A.L.E. 1200.)
"Surface waters are those which are produced
by rain fall, melting snow, or springs, and which
in cases of the two first mentioned sources are
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precipitated, and in the case of the last mentioned
source rise upon the land *** Such waters are not
divested of their character as surface waters by
reason of their flowing from the land on which
they first make their appearance on to lower land
in obedience to the law of gravity." (Le Brun v.
Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 291 Pac. 825, 72 A.L.R.
336.)
"The term 'surface water' includes such as is
carried off by surface drainage—this is drainage
independently of a water course." (Snyder v. Piatt
Valley, etc. Irrig. Co., 144 Neb. 308, 12 N.W. (2d)
160, 160 A.L.R. 1164.)
"*** the weight of authority is to the effect
that the right to flow of surface water from an adjoining tract cannot be acquired by prescription."
(56 Am. Jur. Waters, Sec. 66, pg. 549.)
"From the facts here it is clear that we are
not concerned with the rules which pertain to
surface waters in the commonly accepted meaning #of that term in adjudications of this type.
That term as so used means water diffused over
the surface of the ground and derived generally
from falling rains or melting snow, and it continues to be such until it reaches well defined
channels wherein it customarily flows at which
time it becomes part of a stream. Once part of a
stream, it does not again become surface wrater
simply because it overflows the banks. Water
which continues to flow in the same direction even
though outside the banks, and which returns to the
channel upon the subsidence of the flood is part
of a running stream and it loses its character as
such only when it spreads out over the open country, settles in lakes or pools, or finds some other
outlet." (McKell v. Spanish Fork, 6 Utah (2nd)
92, 305 Pac. (2nd) 1097.)
C. Percolating
Waters
"The waters issuing from the artificial tunnel
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into the lake are found to be underground, percolating waters from the mining claim of the defendant, and not waters naturally flowing in a stream
with a well-defined channel, banks, and course.
Under such a state of facts, the law seems to be
well settled that water percolating through the
soil is not, and cannot be, distinguished from the
soil itself. The owner of the soil is entitled to
the waters percolating through it, and such water
is not subject to appropriation. The ordinary
rules of law applying to the appropriation of
surface streams do not apply to percolating water
and subterranean streams, with undefined and
unknown courses and banks. When water percolates through and under the surface of the earth
upon land belonging to one person, and comes
to the surface just before it empties itself upon
the land of another, the owner of such land has
no right to demand that such percolation shall
continue. ***.
"It is clear that, prior to the time when the
tunnel was dug upon the mining claim of the defendant, the water w^as percolating water, flowing,
seeping, or circulating in minute particles beneath
the surface thereof, without banks or defined channels, and that its course was invisible and unknown. By the construction of this tunnel, this
percolating Avater has become an artificial stream,
and has never been diverted from the defendant's
land, nor its waters taken away from the defendant or its grantors. Under such circumstances,
when percolating waters have been gathered into
tunnels or ditches, and allowed to flow from the
proprietor's land to the inferior proprietor, and
have been used by him a greater period of time
than that allowed by the statute of limitations, it
has been held that no title by prescription has
been gained." {Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver Kino
Mining Co., 17 Utah 444, 54 Pac. 244, 245, 247.)
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"When the United States issued it patent to
the respondent, neither the bog nor marsh, nor
the water in question, was visible upon the land
conveyed. Nor was there any known and defined
subterranean stream thereon. At that time the
water, if it existed at all, was percolating through
the soil, or flowing in a subterranean stream,
having no defined or known channels, courses, or
banks. Water so percolating and flowing forms a
part of the realty, and belongs to the owner of
the soil. A conveyance or grant by the United
States of any part of the public domain to a person, natural or artificial, carries with it the right
of filtrating or percolating water, and to streams
flowing through the soil beneath the surface, but
in undefined and unknown channels, just the same
as it carries with it the right to rocks and minerals
in the ground which have not been reserved in the
instrument of conveyance or by statute. Water,
intermingling with the ground or flowing through
it by filtration or percolation or by chemical attraction, is but a component part of the earth, and
has no characteristics of ownership distinct from
the land itself. In the eye of the law, water so commingled and flowing, or motionless, underneath
the surface, is not the subject of ownership apart
and distinct from the soil. If, however, subsurface streams of water flow in clearly-defined
channels, it is otherwise, for then the rules of
law applicable to surface streams and waters
apply." (Willow Creek Irrigation Co. v. Michaelson, 21 Utah 248, 60 Pac. 943.)
(2) At all times since May 11,1903, the only method
by which plaintiff could have acquired the right to use
the waters which accumulates on defendant's lands in
Sections 9 and 22, Twp. 2 South, Range 5 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, was by formal
appropriation
of same as prescribed by the statutes of the State of Utah.
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The acquisition of rights to use water in Utah by prescription has been prohibited since said date.
A. Constitutional and Statutory
Enactments
"All existing rights to the use of any waters
in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose,
are hereby recognized and confirmed." (Constitution of State of Utah, ART. XVII, Sec. 1.)
"All waters in this state, whether above or
under the ground are hereby declared to be the
property of the public, subject to all existing
rights to the use thereof." (Laws of Utah 1919,
Chap. 67, Sec. 1; R.S. 1933, Sec. 100-1-1; Laws of
Utah 1935, Chap. 105, Sec. 1; Utah Code Ann.
1943, Sec. 100-1-1; Utah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 731-1.)
The Fifth Regular Session of the Legislature of the
State of Utah, convened in February and March, 1903,
adopted a Water Code which repealed all prior laws on
the subject of Water Rights and Irrigation. (Laws of
Utah, 1903, Chap. 100, pg. 88). Section 34 of this enactment reads as follows:
"Rights to the use of any of the unappropriated water in the State may be acquired by appropriation, in the manner hereinafter
provided,
and not otherwise. The appropriation must be
for some useful or beneficial purpose, and, as
between appropriators, the one first in time should
be first in right" (Italics supplied.)
This new Water Code was approved by the Governor
on March 12, 1903, and became effective sixty days after
March 12, 1903 (date of sine die adjournment of the
Legislature), or on May 11, 1903.
The Sixth Regular Session of the Legislature of the
State of Utah convened in February and March, 1905,
repealed Chapter 100 of the Laws of Utah 1903 (Laws of
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Utah 1905, Chap. 108, pg 145), and enacted another Water
Code. However, the 1905 Code continued, Sec. 34 of the
1903 Code, in exact form as above set forth. (It continued to bear the number of Section 34.) The 1905 Code
specifically provided, according to Constitutional mandate, that it should become effective on approval. The
Governor approved the Code March 9,1905, and said date
was therefore the effective date of the 1905 Code.
When Compiled Laws of Utah 1907 were prepared,
the Water Code of 1905 became Chapter 2 of Title 40 of
said Compiled Laws and Sec. 34 of the Water Code of
1903 and 1905 were perpetuated in exact form and phraseology as first above quoted as Sec. 1288X5 Compiled Laws
of Utah 1907.
The Ninth Regular Session of the Legislature of the
State of Utah, convened January-February and March,
1911, amended Sec. 1288X5 (Compiled Laws of Utah
1907, Chap. 103, Laws of Utah 1911, pg. 143) to read as
follows:
"Rights to the use of the
unappropriated
water in the State may be acquired by appropriation in the manner hereinafter provided, and not
otherwise. The appropriation must be for some
useful and beneficial purpose, and, as between
appropriators, the one first in time shall be first
in right; (provided that, when a use designated in
an application to appropriate any of the unappropriated waters of the State would materially interfere with a more beneficial use of such water, then
the appropriation shall be dealt with as provided
in Section 1288X18). (Italics supplied.)
The Governor approved this Act on March 20, 1911.
The Legislative session adjourned March 9, 1911. The
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Act, therefore became effective May 10, 1911.
When Compiled Laws of 1917 were prepared, Sec.
1288X5, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, as amended by
Chapter 103, Laws of Utah, 1911, last above quoted, became Sec. 3450, Comp. Laws of Utah 1917, and was a
part of Title 55, Chap. 3.
The Thirteenth Regular Session of the Legislature
of Utah, convened January, February and March 1919,
by Chapter 67, Laws of Utah 1919 (pg. 177) repealed
the Water Code as it appeared in Title 55, Chapters 1,
2and 3, Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, and enacted an
entirely new Water Code. However, Sec. 41 of this enactment repeated verbatim Sec. 3450, Compiled Laws of
Utah 1917. Chapter 67, Laws of Utah 1919, was approved
March 13, 1919, and since it carried an emergency clause
it became effective on said date.
Title 100, Chap. 3, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933,
set forth verbatim Sec. 41, Laws of Utah 1919 (which
in its amended form was Sec. 3450, Comp. Laws of Utah
1917). In the R.S. of Utah 1933 the pertinent section
was designated Sec. 100-3-1 of the R.S.
The twenty-first Regular Session of the Legislature
of Utah, convened January, February and March 1935,
amended Sec. 100-3-1, R.S. of Utah 1933, to read as follows:
"Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state may be acquired only as
provided in this title. No appropriation of water
may be made and no rights to the use thereof
initiated and no notice of intent to appropriate
shall be recognized except application for such
appropriation first be made to the State Engineer
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in the manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. The appropriation must be for some useful
and beneficial purpose and as between appropriators, the one first in time shall be first in
right; provided that when a use designated by an
application to appropriate any of the unappropriated waters of the State would materially
interfere with a more beneficial use of such water,
the application shall be dealt with as provided in
Section 100-3-8." (Italics supplied.) (Laws of
Utah, 1935, Chap. 105, pg. 195-196.)
The Twenty-third Regular Session of the Legislature of Utah, convened January, February and March
1939, amended Sec. 100-3-1, R.S. of Utah 1933, as amended by Chap. 105, Laws of Utah 1935, Chap. 105, quoted
in full above, by repeating same in exact language as
above set forth and then adding:
"No right to the use of water either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by adverse use or adverse possession."
This amended statute of 1939 carried an emergency
clause and thereby became effective on approval, which
was March 20, 1939.
Utah Code Ann. 1943, repeats
and amendment in exact form as
100-3-1. Likewise Utah Code Ann.
enactment and amendment as Sec.
provision to date.
B. Judicial

the 1939 reenactment
above given, as Sec.
1953 repeats the 1939
73-3-1, and brings the

Decisions

"The question is therefore clearly presented
whether the actual diversion of water prior to
making an application to the state engineer gives
to the party making the diversion a right superior
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to another who first files his -application in the
state engineer's office.
"Chapter 67. Laws of Utah 1919, relates to
water and water rights. The act is designated as
'An act defining general provisions concerning
water and water rights, the appropriation, administration,' etc., and amends some prior laws. Section 41 of that chapter, so far as material here,
provides:
'Rights to the use of the unappropriated
public water in the state may be acquired
by appropriation, in the manner hereinafter
provided, and not otherwise."
"The section further provides that tfte appropriation must be for a beneficial purpose, ana
that as between two appropriators the one first in
time shall be first in right. *** The first Utah
legislative act, so far as I have been able to ascertain, respecting the method or mode of appropriating water, was passed by the Legislature of
1897 (Laws 1897, c. 52). *** By the act of 1897 any
person desiring thereafter to appropriate water
was required to post notices in writing in two
conspicuous places, one at the post office nearest
the point of intended diversion, and the other at
the point of intended diversion. *** Apparently
no other or further legislation was enacted respecting the appropriation of w^ater until 1903.
(Laws 1903 c. 100). The Legislature in that year
incorporated in the act relating to water rights
and irrigation section 41 as the same appears in
chapter 67. Laws Utah 1919. Numerous amendments were made to the irrigation laws of this
state by the Legislatures meeting since 1903, but
in none of such legislation has the method or manner of appropriating water as prescribed by the
Legislature of 1903 been changed or modified. * # *
If our statute did not contain the words 'and not
otherwise,' then the decisions of the appellate
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courts of Idaho and Wyoming ought to and would
have much weight in a determination of the question now under consideration. It is a matter of
common knowledge in this state that many controversies arose between claimants and much litigation resulted prior to our legislative act of 1903
respecting the dates of the appropriation by different claimants of the waters of the state. Very
much of that litigation had to do exclusively with
the dates of the appropriations. The rule or principle of law that he who was first in time was
first in right had become permanently established
in the jurisprudence of the state. The fact as to
who was a prior appropriator was in much, if not
all, of the litigation a controverted question, and
one which in many cases was most difficult to
determine by reason of there being no public record of just when such appropriations were made.
It is therefore not only reasonable and fair to conclude, but affords a strong argument to support
the claim, that the language found in the act of
1903 was intended to mean and does mean that the
only method to be recognized thereafter was the
method therein prescribed. # ** We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that the Legislature of Utah,
by the act of 1903, intended to limit the method of
acquiring any rights to the unappropriated public
waters of the state to the method or means prescribed in that act. The rights attempted to be
acquired by respondent Hooppiania by actually
diverting the water and applying the same to a
beneficial use must therefore be held to be subject
to the right of appellant who will acquire the first
right by completing its appropriation initiated by
its application filed in the state engineer's office
on April 25, 1918." (Deseret Live Stock Co. v.
Hooppiana, 66 Utah 25, 239 Pac. 479, 482, 483.)
" I concur in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice
Gideon that Chopter 67, Sess. Laws of Utah 1919,
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provides an exclusive method for the appropriation of public water in the state of Utah. The very
language and purpose of the act, when construed
in connection with the acts which it superseded
and repealed, demonstrates conclusively that the
purpose was to provide an exclusive method of
appropriating water and securing a record title
thereto. * * * The method presented for appropriating water commences with chapter 100, Sess.
Laws 1903, § 34, which section furnishes the key
for interpreting all that follows down to and
including section 46. Section 34 reads as follows:
'Rights to the use of any of the unappropriated water in the state may be acquired
by appropriation, in the manner hereinafter
provided, and not otherwise. The appropriation must be for some useful or beneficial
purpose, and, as between appropriators, the
one first in time shall be first in right.'
* * * The history of the legislation upon this
subject, as above set forth, discloses the fact that
the statute involving the question now before
the court has been under review at eight different sessions of the Utah Legislature. The law,
as originally enacted in 1903, has been amended
and changed in divers respects, immaterial as
far as the question here is concerned, but the
manifestly exclusive features of the method of
procedure to procure title have never been
changed. * # * If plain, emphatic, unequivocal
language is not sufficient to express the intention
of the Legislature, in what manner and by what
means can the Legislature express its intention?
If there were a single line, word, or thought anywhere in the act inconsistent or in conflict with
the express declaration of the Legislature at the
very starting point of the method of procedure
mapped out by the Legislature, I would concur
in the suggestion that we should resort to rules
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of construction in order to determine the intention of the statute; but the truth is the statute
is so plain from he beginning to the end of the
whole course of procedure that there is no occasion for resorting to rules of construction. * * *
Before concluding this opinion I feel impelled
to say that this statute has been in force for a
period of 22 years. Hundreds of thousands of
dollars of the public money have been expended
in maintaining suitable offices and paraphernalia
for carrying out the purposes of the act, to say
nothing about the amounts paid in salaries to
the state engineer and his deputies, assistants,
and clerks. It cannot be denied that a system
whereby a complete record is required of rights
and titles to the use of water is infinitely superior to a system, if it can be called a system,
in which the evidence of title rests entirely in
parol and depends solely upon the memory of
man. It may be contended that this goes to the
policy of the act which belongs exclusively to the
Legislature, and is therefore outside the domain
of judicial interpretation. We contend, however,
that if the policy of the act is manifestly wise
and superior to previous systems from the stand
point of policy, it is one of the most cogent
reasons why we should hold that the Legislature
must have intended exactly what it said and has
repeated and reiterated time after time for almost a quarter of a century." (Concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Thurman in Deseret Livestock Co.
vs. Hooppiania, supra)
"But respondents argue that all these cases,
except the one last cited, were either tried or
were based upon rights claimed to have been
acquired prior to the enactment of the law of
appropriation of water through the office of the
state engineer, and (1) since the enactment of
that statute, water rights can only be acquired
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by appropriation through the office of the state
engineer and can only be lost by abandonment,
and when abandoned it reverts to the state; and
(2) if water can be acquired by adverse user and
possession since the enactment of the appropriation laws, it cannot be so done after adjudication
of the rights, and in defiance of the terms of the
adjudication decree. The answer to the first proposition is found within the terms of the statute,
relative to appropriation. Sections 100-3-1 and
100-3-2, R.S. 1933, read:
'Rights to the use of the unappropriated
public waters in this state may be acquired
by appropriation in the manner hereinafter
provided, and not otherwise.' Section 100-3-1.
'Any person who is a citizen * * * in
order hereafter to acquire the right to the
use of any unappropriated public water in
this state shall before commencing the construction * * * make an application in writing to the state engineer.' Section 100-3-2.
It is clear from the language that the sections
above quoted apply only to acquiring rights in
the unappropriated public water, and have no
reference to water rights which have passed to
private ownership until they have been abandoned
and thereby reverted to the public. How may
water rights under the statute be lost? Section
3468, Comp. Laws 1917, in force during the times
involved in this action, reads:
'When the appropriator or his successor
in interest abandons or ceases to use water
for a period of seven years, the right ceases,
and thereupon such water reverts to the
public, and may again be appropriated, as provided in this title; but questions of abandonment
shall be questions of fact, and shall be determined as are other questions of fact.'
Construing this section, this court in Deseret
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Live Stock Co. v. Hooppiania, 66 Utah, 25, 239
P. 479, 481, said:
'By express language of the foregoing
statute there are two methods or means by
which one entitled to the use of waters in
the state may lose such right: (1) by abandonment; and (2) by ceasing to use the same
for a period of seven y e a r s . ' "
(Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 Pac. (2nd)
894, 899; also 94 Utah 35, 75 Pac. (2nd) 164)
"Under our laws, rights in and to the use
of public waters, or of a natural stream or source,
may be acquired only by appropriation and by
an actual diversion of waters from the natural
channel or stream and a beneficial use made of
them and as by our statutes provided. Neither
the defendants nor their predecessors made any
diversion of the waters of the creek for watering
live stock or for any other purpose. They, without
any diversion, merely permitted animals to drink
directly from the creek. That gave them no right
to or possession of the use of the waters, for as
said by the author, 2 Kinney on Irrigation and
Water Eights, 1242 that as 'no possession or
exclusive property (of water) can be acquired
while it is still flowing and remaining in its
natural channel or stream, it follows, therefore,
that in order to obtain possession of the water
attempted to be appropriated, it is an indispensable requisite that there must be an actual diversion of the water from its natural channel into
the appropriator's ditch, canal, reservoir, or other
structure.' Cases are there cited in support of
the text." (Bountiful City v. De Luca, 77 Utah
107, 118; 292 Pac. 194, 199; 72 A.L.R. 657)
"If this be new or added water, no right
thereto can attach or be asserted until after an
application has been filed in the office of the
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state engineer. Deseret Live Stock Co. v. Hooppiania, 66 Utah 25, 239 P . 479; Bountiful City v.
Be Luca, 77 Utah 107, 292 P. 194, 72 A.L.R. 657.
If it be considered as merely a change in place
of diversion, it also must start with an application
in the office of the state engineer, and notice
must be given so interested parties could be heard
and their rights protected. Appellants pleaded in
their answer, and testified, that the proposed
works w^ould save from evaporation and seepage
a considerable quantity of water and the Company
would permit the Town to divert into its pipe
line a part thereof in consideration of the Town
doing the work and furnishing the money to
effect the savings. No application was made to
the state engineer either to appropriate this water
or to change the point of diversion of their water.
It is admitted that defendants' works would inclose the entire stream now flowing in its natural
channel, thus excluding everyone (the public)
from enjoyment of all rights therein. When a
person seeks to do this, he has the burden of
showing his right so to do, and this burden appellants did not carry." (Adams v. Town of Portage,
95 Utah 1, 72 Pac. ((2nd) 648, 654
"What we did say was that the records (the
pleadings of appellant and the evidence) show the
waters in dispute, from which appellant sought to
exclude respondents and the public generally,
were waters which appellants had not appropriated, either by user before enactment of the statutory method, chapter 100, Laws Utah, 1903, now
Eev. St. 1933, 100-3-1 et seq., or by application
in the office of the engineer since such method
was prescribed. The trial court so found, and we
upheld that finding. Thus, holding that appellants
had never had any rights to the waters used by
respondents, the question of adverse user since
1903 is in nowise determinative of the cause."
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(Adams v. Town of Portage, 95 Utah 20, 81 Pac.
(2nd) 368 on rehearing)
"In the light of this evidence we proceed to
consider the defenses urged. First, as to the defense of valid appropriation. We conclude that
if these defendants had made a valid appropri
ation prior to the Kimball Decree, all rights secured thereunder would have been lost by the
entry of that Decree which awarded them no
water. Since the entry of the Kimball Decree in
1922, in fact since 1903, the method for appropriation of unappropriated water has been prescribed
by statute and we have consistently held that
this statutory procedure for appropriating water
is exclusive. Hammond v. Johnson, supra; Adams
v. Portage Irr. Reservoir, § Power Co., supra;
Deseret Live Stock Co. v. Hooppiania,
supra;
Bountiful City v. Be Luca, 77 Utah 107, 292 P.
194; 72 A.L.R. 657. Although this statutory procedure has been amended at various times (see
Chap. 105, Laws of Utah 1935, Chap. I l l , Laws
of Utah 1939) at all times since 1903 the statutory
procedure has required a filing of an application
with the State Engineer. The evidence fails to
show that this procedure was followed by these
defendants and their defense of valid appropriation must fail." (Wellsville East Field Irr. Co. v.
Lindsay Land # L. Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 Pac.
(2nd) 634, 644)
3. ARGUMENT
(A) The waters on defendants' land in Sec. 9
and 22 were not and are not subject to appropriation or prescriptive user.
The findings of the jury do not disclose the nature,
source, origin, kind or quantity of water which plaintiff
and his witnesses assert exist and has existed upon
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defendant's lands in Sections 9 and 22, Twp. 2 S., Range
5 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. The responses
by the jury to the interrogatories propounded to it
by the Court simply indicate the time element involved
in plaintiff's alleged use of the waters based on an
assumption that water in some amount existed on Sees.
9 and 22, during the duration of use. It is therefore
necessary to examine and consider the relevant evidence
in order to determine the necessary facts with respect
to said water.
Insofar as the defendant's evidence is concerned,
it denies the existence of water and "water holes" on
said lands (R. 136) and presents proof that at the most
there existed during certain seasons of certain years only
"bogs" or "mud holes" located in certain small restricted
areas (R. 177, 178, 179, 186). They were occasioned by
precipitation primarily and flow of melting snows and
probably by a small amount of percolating water in defendant's land which came to the surface and then gravitted to low places on said land (R. 137). The source of
this small amount of moisture is not directly disclosed
by the evidence. Defendant's evidence was corroborated
by that of the witnesses, Aldous, Palmer and Price, who
testified that there was a "bog" on Sec. 9, but no water
holes (R. 175, 177, 178, 179, 181, 241, 242).
Plaintiff's evidence in the main contradicts that of
of the defendant. Plaintiff and his witnesses testified as
to water and "water holes" but never mentioned the
source of the water. It is interesting to note that plaintiff's evidence during the course of trial became progressively more "moist" and "wetter." Commencing with
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plaintiffs own testimony in his case in chief—"The whole
place is not covered with water. There are holes watered.
Did yon ever see a cow make a track * * *" (R. 86).
"There is not enough water to flow away" (R. 87). (Plaintiff testified there existed a water hole in SE y^ Sec. 9
Sec. 22) (R. 63, 64, 83, 84). He marked these alleged
holes on the map P Ex. 1 (R. 64). When plaintiff testified
on rebuttal, the one water hole in Sec. 9 became (R. 83)
four holes (R. 279) and they contained water during all
months of the year and they always contained water
that cattle could and do use (R. 279, 280). Pierre Castagno produced sufficient water in these "holes" to
water 30 or 40 horses (R. 255). Tony Castagno asserted
that the "holes" never dried up and contained water
during all years at all times in sufficient amount to
water cattle (R. 295). Rose Castagno asserted that the
"holes" never dried up and there was water in them at
all times of drinkable quality (R. 304). Keith
Wanless
called the water accumulations "spring holes" (R. 309).
He said they contained "spring water" not "run off"
water (R. 316) but did not identify the source of the
water. Cattle drank at the so-called "holes" (R. 310).
The conflict in the evidence as to whether water
existed on the defendant's lands was not resolved by
the jury. It remains a question of fact for the fact
finder. If no water is found to exist, then of course the
defendant is entitled to judgment on this issue. However, defendant believes it expedient to present his argument on the assumption (and this is an assumption in
favor of plaintiff and is made for purposes of argument only) that some kind of water and of some (but
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unknown amount has existed on Sees. 9 and 22 aforesaid.
Plaintiff's evidence identifies this water as either
(a) waste or seepage water, or (b) surface water, or
(c) percolating water. It is certainly not water flowing
in an established course. It is not water in a pond. It is
not water flowing directly from a spring. It is not
"live" water. It is not "natural" water. It possesses
certain elements of "surface" water and certain elements
of percolating water. Interpreting the evidence in a light
most favorable to plaintiff, the water appears to be
"dead" water representing moisture which has accumulated in low places on defendant's land during certain
periods of the year depending upon amount of natural
precipitation and seepage from other areas.
The water thus identified and described by plaintiff
and his witnesses is exactly the type and kind of water
that is not and never has been subject either to formal
appropriation under the water laws nor subject to be
acquired by prescriptive user. The authorities cited above
from Utah and neighboring states without contradiction
declare this principle. Quoted authorities on irrigation
and water law, after defining waste or seepage water,
surface and percolating water, unanimously declare that
the use thereof cannot be acquired by prescriptive user.
It is not the type or kind of water described in Sullivan
vs. Northern Spy Mining Co., 11 Utah 438, 40 Pac. 709,
55 A.L.E. 1448, but rather it classifies under the heading
of percolating water "rising in the form of a bog or
marsh" as was involved in Willow Creek Irrigation Co.
v. Michaelssen, supra, or underground percolating water
of Cresent Mining Co. vs. Silver King Mining Co., supra.
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Allowing the evidence in this case its maximum
thrust in favor of plaintiff, it falls far short of establishing and identifying the water on defendant's lands
as being water subject to appropriation or the use of
which may be obtained by prescription. P a r t of this
water was and is undoubtedly a component part of the
earth owned by defendant, percolating through defendant's soil and finally coming to the surface to form
bogs or marshes. It can be surmised that other parts
of it represent melting snow and rain which have
fallen on the surface of defendant's land and then
drained to low places on his land. Plaintiff's evidence
does not even imply or suggest that any part of it
came from artesian wells driven by plaintiff in Sees.
9 and 22. His evidence carefully eliminates this source
because they were driven only within the last two or
three years.
In resolving the conflict in evidence the court made
the following findings:
"19. A small but uncertain amount of water
has accumulated during certain seasons of years
upon lands of defendant situated in Sections 9
and 22, Township 2, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, for 20 years prior to May 31, 1955.
It has not been and is not water of the type, kind
or quality that title thereto or use thereof can be
acquired by prescription, adverse possession or
adverse user, being either waste water, surface
water or percolating water. Such water has accumulated in low places consisting of swales and
marshy areas of these sections. It has remained
\ in low areas and has not flowed out upon adjoining land. Much of the water is surface water
which was produced by rainfall and melting snows.
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Its quantity has varied from year to year. During
dry seasons of the years and during years of small
or limited precipitation the small amount of w^ater
in these low areas disappeared and the low areas
became mere bogs or mud holes. During certain
periods of the years when water accumulated in
these low places wandering cattle OAvned by plaintiff and others drank at these lo wplaces. Neither
plaintiff nor his predecessors in title and interest
have ever attempted any appropriation of said
water under the statutes of the State of Utah.
This accumulation of water does not originate or
flow from any natural water course nor has it
ever originated or flowed from any natural water
course. A small proportion of this water is probably water which percolates and has percolated
through the soil of defendant's lands and finally
came to the surface in the low areas described.
Said amount of said water forms and has always
formed a part of the realty which has belonged
and now belongs to defendant. There is no known
and defined subterranean stream on defendant's
land or in the vicinity thereof wherein this water
might originate."
The trial court found in favor of the defendant
on this aspect of the case. He is therefore entitled upon
appellate review to have the evidence and every reasonable inference fairly to be drawn therefrom to be viewed
in the light most favorable to him. (Buehner Block Co.
vs. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P. 2d 517; Beck vs. Jeppson, 1 Utah 2d 127, 262 P. 2d 760.)
Furthermore, when the testimony is conflicting the
appellate court will not disturb the findings of the trial
court unless so manifestly erroneous as to demonstrate
some oversight or mistake affecting the substantial rights
of appellant. {Klopenstine vs. Hayes, 20 Utah 45, 57
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Pac. 712; Singleton vs. Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212 Pac. 63,
66; Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 Pac. 313;
McMonegal vs. Fritsch Loan and Trust Co., 75 Utah 470,
268 Pac. 635.)
There is substantial evidence to sustain the foregoing findings. It was the duty of the trial court to
resolve the conflict, and having resolved the conflict in
defendant's favor, the rules cited above apply.
It is therefore the contention of defendant that
under the law and facts of this case that plaintiff did
not and could not acquire a prescriptive use of the
waters on defendant's land in Sees. 9 and 22 for the
reason that the proof shows they were either (a) waste
or seepage water, or (b) surface water, or (c) percolating water, or a combination of same. The law denies
that the use of such water may be obtained by prescription, because such water is not "water" of the type, nature
or kind subject to appropriation or prescriptive use.
(B) In the alternative, if it be adjudged that the
waters on defendant's land in Sees. 9 and 22 have been
and are waters subject to the law of appropriation and
prescription, then plaintiff did not and could not acquire
a prescriptive use of same.
In the event the Court refuses to adopt defendant's
contention and theory above presented that the waters
on defendant's land were not and are not subject to
the law of appropriation and prescription and reaches
the conclusion that they were and are waters subject
to appropriation and prescriptive user, then defendant
emphatically asserts that plaintiff, under the law of
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Utah, could not and did not acquire a prescriptive right
to use same.
Neither plaintiff nor defendant has made any filing
in the office of the State Engineer appropriating said
waters and neither of them have actually diverted said
waters from their natural collecting basins by means
of ditches, canals or other structures. Under this hypothesis the waters are public waters under the quoted
Constitutional provision, statutes and decisions of the
Utah Supreme Court. This court faces two alternatives :
(1) it must declare that these waters are not "water"
under the water laws of Utah, but are waters of the
type and kind described in Willow Creek and Crescent
and not subject to appropriation or prescriptive user,
or (2) it must declare these waters to be public waters
owned by the public. There is no other choice. The argument which follows is submitted on the assumption (and
without de-emphasizing defendant's first contention and
line of defense) that the Court adopts the second alternative.
Defendant, in this brief, has summarized the history
of present Sec. 73-9-1, Utah Code Ann. 1953, from the
year 1903 to the present which is the vital and determining statutory enactment in this case. The original 1903
statute effective May 11, 1903, during the passage of
the years has been amended and re-written many times,
but it has always retained either in form or substance
this vital mandate:
"Rights to the use of any of the unappropriated water in the State may be acquired by appropriation, in the manner hereinafter provided,
and not otherwise"
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As the cited decisions of the Utah Supreme Court
disclose, this provision of law (and its amendments and
amplifications) have been the subject of judicial construction with resultant legislative amendments. However, one clear certain fact shines through all of the
decisions (many of them involving complicated and complex situations) and legislation, and that is that the
use of unappropriated public waters since May 11, 1903,
can be acquired only through the methods prescribed by
the legislature "and not otherwise." As to these waters,
the acquisition of same by prescription has been outlawed since May 11, 1903.
The two decisions which announce this rule are
Hooppiania and Hammond v. Johnson. There has never
been any deviation from the rule pronounced by them
and the rule therein laid down has been a fixed, unquestioned rule in Utah since May 11, 1903. The controversy which arose in connection with the interpretation
of this statutory provision involved waters the use of
which had passed from the public to private
ownership
and not as to waters which were "public" waters. The
final form of the statute as it appears as Sec. 73-3-1,
Utah Code Ann. 1953, represents the legislative determination that even as to "private water" there can be
no acquisition of use by prescription. All through the
years the dispute has never involved the rule of Hooppiania and Hammond as applied to public waters, but
always as to whether the statutory negation "and not
otherwise" applied to waters the use of which had passed
from the "public" to "private ownership." An examination and analysis of the cited decisions and of the many
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authorities discussed and cited therein shows that the
Supreme Court persistently made the distinction herein
elucidated. It is in the cases where the use of water had
passed to private ownership that the Court refused to
apply what may be called the "not otherwise" rule
governing public waters and engaged in discussions
concerning the questions of abandonment, non-user, adverse user, forfeiture, interruption in usage and the
like questions. Lindsay graphically demonstrates the
distinction. In that case the irrigation company had
obtained a court decree fixing and determining the water
rights in Little Bear River. Lindsay and its predecessor
were not parties to the decree and continued to use
water from the river not decreed to them. The contest
was between private parties. Judge Larsen in Hammond
pointed up the distinction in his declaration:
"But neither abandonment nor forfeiture by
non-user takes cognizance of or applies to a
situation where a third party has entered the
scene." (66 Pac. (2nd) at 900)
Commencing with March 20, 1939, the Legislature applied the rule of Hooppiania and Hammond to private
waters. If there has been and there is water on defendant's said lands (an issue in this case) and the same
is not waste or seepage water, surface or percolating
water, then it always has been and is now "public water"
within Hooppiania and Hammond. On this hypothesis,
plaintiff never has acquired prescriptive use of same
because of the prohibition of the statute effective from
May 11, 1903, to the present date. If the date of filing
plaintiff's cross-complaint (Jan. 6, 1956) be taken, then
the elapsed time since May 11, 1903, is 52 years, 7
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months and 25 days. If the date plaintiff commenced
this action (May 31, 1955) be taken then the elapsed
time is 52 years and 20 days. During all of this time
the 1903 statute and its amendments and amplifications
absolutely prohibited the plaintiff from acquiring the
right to the use of the water by prescription. The findings
of the jury is to the effect that plaintiff and his predecessors in ownership used said water holes for 50
consecutive years prior to May 31, 1955. Plaintiff and
his predecessors therefore commenced to use said water
on May 31, 1905, but at this time the 1903 statute was
operative as to this water, and forbade the initiation
of a period of prescriptive user. It is repeated that
neither plaintiff nor defendant has applied to the State
Engineer to appropriate said water, as mandated by
statute if rights to use same were to be acquired, nor
has any diversionary works been erected.
It is interesting to note that plaintiff's witness,
Pierre Castagne, is 50 years old (E. 246); that plaintiff's
witness, Tony Castagno, is 53 years old (E. 293); that
plaintiff's witness, Eose Castagno, fixed the years 19361937 as the time she first "helped with live stock" in
connection with the Cassity-Castagno land (E. 301, 302,
303); that plaintiff's witness, Wanless, first worked for
plaintiff and on his land in 1941 (E. 308). As to Pierre
and Tony, manifestly their memories at the maximum
cannot go back for more than 40 or 45 years. As to
Eose, her testimony would encompass a period of 20
years at the maximum. As to Wanless, 15 years only
are within his memory. The plaintiff, himself, was vague
and gave no date as to commencement of use of the
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waters. He stated that "cattle drank at the holes as
long as he can remember." (B. 65). Manifestly this testimony does not prove any use prior to May 11, 1903 (B.
89). It is directed to the time subsequent to said date—
all within the interdicted period. The jury's finding
that plaintiff and his predecessors used said water holes
for 50 consecutive years prior to May 31, 1955, means
exactly what it says. The underlying evidence would not
support a finding of usage prior to May 31, 1905.
Under this state of the law and the facts, defendant
contends and submits that plaintiff obtained no prescriptive right to use these waters. I t becomes entirely immaterial as to when the defendant's lands passed from
ownership of the United States to private ownership.
The doctrine of Sullivan v. Northern Spy Mining Co.,
supra, as recognized by the Act of Congress of July 26,
1866 (43 U.S.C.A. 661) is to the effect that
"To initiate and acquire a right in and to
the use of unappropriated public water, whether
on the public domain or within a reservation or
elsewhere, is dependent upon the laws or customs
of the state in which the water is found." (Sewards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 108 Pac. 212)
governs the situation as disclosed by the evidence in
this case. Under the law of the State of Utah, plaintiff
could acquire by prescription no rights in the water
on defendant's land.
With the disappearance of plaintiff's alleged rights
in the water there also disappears any rights of ingress
or egress for its enjoyment. Such implied easement
must find its existence in the right to the water and
when no right to the water exists there is no easement
(Wendler v. Woodward, 93 Wash. 684; 161 Pac. 1043).
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PART B
ANALYSIS OF APPELLANT'S
OF ERRORS IN ARGUMENTS
LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND DEMONSTRATION
POINTS I AND II. It is respectfully submitted
that Eespondent in Part A — Respondent's Argument
and Demonstration of Validity of Judgment — has fully
demonstrated the validity of the judgment in this case
in his favor and has thereby shown to the Court that
Appellant's arguments in support of these points in his
brief are unsound and not supported by either the law
or the facts in this case. It is believed that there is no
necessity of further comment on these points.
POINT III covers rulings of the trial Court in the
exclusion of evidence. Each ruling will be treated separately.
1. The excluded evidence pertained to a supposed
right to trail cattle from an area marked on P Ex. I in
pink bearing the figure "3" to the "old homestead" being
shown on said exhibit in pink and marked with the figure
"2." In none of Plaintiff's pleadings did he allege any
such trail way easement. The basis of his claim for
such easement related only to trailing cattle to and from
Stansbury Island (R. 258, 259, 260, 263). Plaintiff's allegations in paragraph 1 of his first separate defense
(Record of Appeal, Plaintiff's Answer to Defendant's
cross claims) are definitely tied to the so-called Stansbury Island "trailway." The attempted production of
this evidence at the trial was a surprise to Respondent
as there was no warning pleading of any such claim.
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The Court properly struck such evidence (R. 263).
2. Appellant propounded this question to the Witness Pierre Castagno:
"Do you have an opinion, Pierre, as to how
the quantity of forage consumed and trampled
down, by making this trail use of your brother
(Respondent) would compare to the quantity of
forage which his land about which you have just
testified? (R. 269).
In explanation of this question Appellant's counsel said:
"I believe it shows he made use of these
lands for the period which we are here involved
with a certain number of head of cattle and a
certain way. What I am trying to show is how
that use compares to the total quantity of forage
which is supported or produced by the lands, he,
himself, owns within this very area." (R. 270).
The "he" referred to in the explanation is the Respondent,
Castagno (R. 270). The Court then asked: "Are you
trying to compare damages now?" (R. 270). Appellant's
counsel responded: "It would have that result, yes."
(R. 270). The Court sustained Respondent's objection
to this question. The ruling was proper as the answer
of this witness to this question would in no sense bear
on the question of damages accruing to the Respondent
by virtue of the Appellant using Respondent's land as
a trailway. The comparison between the amount of forage
consumed by Appellant's cattle on Respondent's lands
and the total amount the land would produce is not the
correct measure of damages for the trespass (52 Am. Jur.
—Trespass—Sec. 49, pp. 873-875).
3. The excluded testimony pertained to an alleged
conversation between Appellant and Appellant's deceased
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father-in-law relative to the quantity and quality of
water in the so-called "water holes" (R. 278, 279). The
testimony was hear say. (Jones on Evidence (Ed. De
Luxe) Sec. 297; Wigmore's Code of Evidence, Rule 147,
P. 259).
4. This action was tried in January, 1957. Appellant's counsel propounded this question to Appellant:
"Have you seen cattle watering in this dry year?" (Emphasis supplied). The answer was "Yes." The complaint
in this action was filed on May 31, 1955. Upon motion
of Respondent the Court struck Appellant's answer.
Thereupon Appellant was asked by his counsel: "Is this
as dry a year as during any of the years prior to 1955?"
(R. 282). The witness answered: "Yes." He was then
asked: "Is it drier?" Objection was sustained. The Court
was correct in its ruling. The condition in 1957 — "This
year" (which was subsequent to the commencement of
the action) was not a proper reference base upon which
to draw an inference as to prior conditions.
5. The following excerpt applies to this alleged
error:
"Q. Do you know, Mr. Cassity, approximately when the homestead was filed by Mr.
Castagno on the lands marked with a "numeral
2?"
"THE COURT: Hasn't that been stipulated?
"MR. OMAN: As to the date the patent was
issued, but not the date he filed it.
"MR. RITER: That is immaterial, and I object to it.
"THE COURT: Do you object on the ground
that it's not the best evidence ?
"MR. RITER: Yes.
"THE COURT: The objection is sustained."
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It requires no citation of authorities to show that Appellant could not prove matters pertaining to the homestead
application of Castagno by mere oral statements of
Cassity as to date of filing of the homestead application
by Castagno in the Federal General Land Office. No
foundation was laid for the admission of this secondary
evidence. If relevant and material to the issues in this
case there was a way of proving such facts, but not by
the method followed by Appellant in this instance. The
best evidence rule clearly forbids such method of proof.
There was no error.
6. This alleged error in exclusion of evidence will
be discussed hereafter in connection with the discussion
of Point V of Appellant's brief.
POINT IV. Through clerical error the Findings
of Fact and the Judgment erroneously attributed to
the Respondent ownership of the following land:
NW14NE14; N E y 4 N W y 4 ; S W ^ N W ^ and Wy 2 S W % , Twp 2South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.
This land in truth is owned by Appellant. The ownership paragraph of Finding 3 and Paragraph 7 (A) of
the Judgment should be corrected by eliminating said
lands from an adjudication of Respondent's ownership.
POINT V. Appellant asserts that a "promissory
estoppel" exists as against Respondent as a justification
of Appellant over running Respondent's land with cattle
owned by Appellant. This claim is based on fragmentary
evidence given by the Respondent on a Rule 43 (b)
examination at the trial (R. 10, 11). Appellant's pleadings in this case raise no such issue. Neither in his
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original complaint nor in his supplemental complaint
did he make allegations that his alleged right to trail
cattle over Kespondent's land was based on conduct
of Eespondent which created an estoppel.
"In pleading an estoppel in pais, the rule
prevails that the plea must be certain in every
particular, and must allege every material fact
which the pleader expects to prove or upon which
the estoppel is predicated. The estoppel must be
pleaded with the same fullness and particularity
as are required in cases involving like subjects of
inquiry in suits in equity." 19 Am. J u r . Estoppel
Sec. 193." (Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms
—Estoppel, Vol. 8, P . 181).
Under this argument, estoppel — whether it be in pais
or a so-called "promissory estoppel — is "an element
ol the cause of action." I t must be pleaded. (Berow etal
vs. Shields et ux, 48 Utah 270, 159 Pac. 538; Barber vs.
Anderson, 73 Utah, 375 274 Pac. 136; Annotation 120
ALR 105). Respondent again invites the Court's attention to the fact that Appellant's case, as based on his
pleadings, is based solely on the claim of prescriptive
user. The trial court properly struck the evidence relating
to an alleged transaction pertaining to the "homestead"
land of Respondent (R. 11) in view of the state of the
pleadings. However, it should be noted that Appellant's
counsel did not at the time of the trial claim it supported
the claim of an estoppel. He asserted "* * * but now he
(Castagno) has refused to sell that out, because of things
which have transpired between the parties here, and
he has come to interfere with this operation of Cassity.
I claim that actually—." F o r the foregoing reason, the
Court was correct in striking the evidence pertaining
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to an alleged agreement of the Respondent to sell Appellant the "homestead" land (R. 10, 11). (See also Point
II, 5 of Appellant's brief at page 28), and in not allowing
Appellant's counsel to pursue such line of questioning.
It will be noted that Respondent acted promptly to
eliminate testimony on this point as soon as it became
apparent the purpose thereof (R. 10,11).
CONCLUSION
The vein of thought runs through Appellant's brief
that his claimed necessity of using Respondent's land
for the operation of his live stock business, gives him
some kind of legal right to subordinate it to his use and
convenience regardless of the rights of Respondent.
The judgment in this case denies such philosophy. It
upholds the doctrine that each man should use his own
property in such manner as not to injure his neighbor.
The judgment should be affirmed, except to the correction of the clerical error above noted.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANKLIN RITER

Attorney for Respondent
Suite 312 Kearns Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah

61
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was the same and the same reasons
e given for desiring the severance.
; situation here is analogous to the exple given in the Restatement of the Law
Judgments, Sec. 61, Comment c, where
is pointed out that where there have
n two batteries by and against the same
son at different times the principle of
judicata does not apply because the
nsactions are different "even though un• the pleadings in the first action evilce as to the second battery would have
:n admissible and would have sustained
: first action."

In other words, the effect which respondent claims for the previous decision in
this case is that the city may take actions which completely nullify the severance decreed in that action, but because
there was a former action appellants are
forever barred from contesting the annexation of their property to the city because
the court in the previous action determined
similar issues in their favor. Such decision not being adverse to appellants'
claim in this action does not have the effect of preventing them from maintaining
this action. Such a holding would have
the effect of reversing the decision which
is now claimed to be determinative of this
case. This strange result clearly demonstrates that the issues are different in the
two cases.

^4] Although the court in the prior acn had found from the evidence presented
it that justice and equity required a
rerance and in the ordinary case where
judgment has been granted on issues
Reversed. Parties to bear their own
lich have been litigated between the same
costs.
rties such issues under the doctrine of
[lateral estoppel 3 cannot be relitigated in
McDONOUGH, C. J., and CROCKETT,
subsequent but different cause of action,
W
O R T H E N and H E N R I O D , JJ., concur.
is doctrine does not apply here because
at doctrine does not have any bearing on
e question here presented. That doc( o I KEY NUMBER!SYSTEM^
I
*
ine only applies where a question of fact
sential to and determinative of the judgent is actually litigated and determined
r
a valid or final judgment which is conusive as between the parties to a subseJoseph Lavern BOYER, Plaintiff and
ient action on a different cause of action.
Appellant,
ince this action is based on a new and '
v.
fferent ordinance which necessarily reClifford C L A R K , Defendant and Respondent.
lires the determination of essentially difNo. 8681.
:rent facts from those determined in the
-evious action that doctrine can have no
Supreme Court of Utah.
^plication to this case.
May 23, 1958.
Another and controlling reason why re1
i
)ondent's position cannot be sustained is
Action
to
have
a
road
declared
a
public
lat in the former action the court severed
le land from the city, but if we were to highway and to restrain defendant from in[firm the trial court's decision that ap- terfering with travel by the public and for
ellants cannot maintain this action, the damages. From a judgment of the Third
ffect would be to overrule the previous District Court, Summit County, Charles G.
ecision and hold that appellants may not Cowley, J., in favor of defendant, the plainow assert the
rights therein granted them. tiff appealed.
The
Court, Wade,
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J., held that evidence that for a period exceeding 50 years, the public, even though
noj consisting of a great many persons,
because comparatively few people had
need to travel over it, made a continuous
and uninterrupted use of wagon trail in
'raveling by wagon and other vehicles and
by horse as often as they found it convenient or necessary, and that they trailed
:attle and sheep, hauled coal, and used such
;rail for other purposes in traveling from
Srass Creek and various other points to and
"rom highway was sufficient as matter of
aw to establish a highway by dedication.
Reversed with instructions.

dedication <§^37
Evidence that for a period exceeding
•0 years, the public, even though not conisting of a great many persons, "because
omparatively few people had need to travel
iver it, made a continuous and uninterruptd use of wagon trail in traveling by wagon
nd other vehicles and by horse as often
s they found it convenient or necessary,
nd that they trailed cattle and sheep,
auled coal, and used such trail for other
urposes in traveling from Grass Creek and
arious other points to and from highway
ras sufficient as matter of law to establish
highway by dedication. U.S.C.A. 1953,
7-1-3. 1

The road in question is a wagon trail
which runs in a northerly direction up Middle Canyon and over a ridge into Grass
Creek from S.tate Highway 133, which goes
easterly up Chalk Creek Canyon from Coalville to Upton, Utah and beyond. The junction of this wagon trail with State Highway
No. 133 is in Section 33 on respondent's
property over which it traverses from 750
to 1500 feet to the north half of Section 33
and from there over the north half of that
section on land owned by one Erconbrack
into Section 28 belonging to appellant. It
also continues to the north across Section 21
before Grass Creek is reached. It was a
part of the public domain until title passed
from the Government to the Union Pacific
Railroad Company to which patent issued
in 1902.

The undisputed testimony of James H.
Judd who was about 84 years old at the time
of the trial in 1956 was that his home had
been in Upton when he was 8 or 10 years
old when he first became acquainted with
Middle Canyon Road while helping his
father haul coal from mines in Grass Creek.
He also testified that he had used the road
for over 50 years when hauling coal, crossing the open range, driving cattle, sheep and
courting the girl he later married in Grass
Creek. He further testified that anyone
who wanted to, used the road to haul coal,
drive sheep and cattle or ride horses or
wagons over it. There was also testimony
of a number of other witnesses that the use
Boyden, Tibbals, Staten & Croft, Salt of the road, was not changed after patent
ake City, for appellant.
w,as issued and anyone who wanted to use it
to go deer hunting or visiting with people
Fowler & Matheson, Salt Lake City, for
living in the vicinity or to dances which
ispondent.
were held in Grass Creek did so, as well as
those who used it to trail sheep or cattle.
WADE, Justice.
No one testified that prior to the time respondent acquired the property in question
This action was commenced by Joseph
avern Boyer to have Middle Canyon Road permission was asked or obtained from any
blared a public highway, to restrain re- owner to traverse the trail. The use of the
londent, Clifford Clark, from interfering road was not great because comparatively
few people had need to travel over it, but
ith travel by the public and for damages,
those
of theClark
public
had
such need, did
his appeal
is
from
a
judgment
adverse
to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Law who
School,
BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may
errors.
so. contain
Within
the past few years prior to the
)pellant.

Cite as 326 P.2d 107

1 of this action in 1956, both appellant
respondent have put no trespassing
is on their properties and have attempted
:harge deer hunters who wanted to use
ir properties. However, no objection
5 made nor did any of the owners of
perty over which the trail traversed
smpt to interfere in the public's use until
pondent tried to prevent such use a short
te before this action was commenced.
spondent became the owner of the land in
istion approximately 12 years before the
nmencement of this action. He testified
it since he has become acquainted with
i trail, it does not extend to Grass Creek,
t ends somewhere up Middle Canyon.
ddle Canyon Road has never been mainned at public expense.
The court as the trier of the facts found
at appellant "had failed to produce suffimt evidence to establish a public high1V * *. *»

of the right of way over the public lands,
and thus would constitute and create the
road in question a public highway by dedication." See also Jeremy v. Bertagnole,
101 Utah 1, 116 P.2d 420, 423.
The uncontradicted evidence in the instant case disclosed that for a period exceeding 50 years, the public, even though
not consisting of a great many persons,
made a continuous and uninterrupted use
of Middle Canyon Road in traveling by
wagon and other vehicles and by horse from
Upton to Grass Creek and other points as
often as they found it convenient or necessary. They trailed cattle, and sheep,
hauled coal, and used this trail for other
purposes in traveling from Grass Creek and
various other points to and from Highway
133. This evidence was sufficient as a
matter of law to establish a highway by
dedication and the court erred in finding
otherwise. The highway once having been
established by such use, it is provided by
statute, Sec. 27-1-3, U.C.A.1953, that it
" * * * must continue to be highway (s)
until abandoned by order of the board of
county commissioners' * ' * * or -other
competent authority." * There is no contention that any such procedure has been
invoked here.

In Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v.
lurnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646, 648, this
>urt pointed out that Congress in 1866
lacted Section 2477, Revised Statutes of
e United States (43 U.S.C.A. § 932)
herein it granted the right of way for
iblic highways over public lands not reirved for public uses, and that an acceptnce of such grant could be made "by public
Due to the fact that the trial court did
se without formal action by public author- not find it was a public highway, it failies, and that continued use of the road ed to find on two further issues dependent
y the public for such length of time and upon such fact, which it will be necessary
nder such circumstances as to clearly in- to determine upon remand: (1) the width
icate an intention on the part of the public of the highway, which must be determined
3 accept the grant is sufficient." We fur- in accordance with what is reasonable and
her pointed out that under our territorial necessary for the uses to which the road has
been put; (2) any damages proximately
aws a continuous and uninterrupted use of
i road by the public for a period of 10 years resulting to the plaintiff by the wrongful
vas sufficient to create a public highway conduct of the defendant in closing and
>y use, and where the evidence showed that excluding him from the roadway.
'while the lands traversed by the road were
Reversed, with instructions to proceed
)ublic lands of the United States the road
in accordance with this opinion. Costs to
vas used as a public thoroughfare'' for a
plaintiff.
period exceeding that required by our statutes for creating a public highway by use,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
such evidence
"is sufficient in law to amount
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and
J . D. Mitchell, Intervenor-Appellant.
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Department 2.
Argued a^id Submitted Jan. 8, 1958.
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superior to that of defendant; but when
each party claims t o be owner, burden
is upon each adverse claimant to make
good his affirmative averments by evidence touching his own title to property.
4. Navigable Waters <§=>42(l)

In suit to quiet title to gravel bar in
Willamette River, evidence would not sustain plaintiffs' contention that land involved had not been an island at low water
during effective period of statute relinquishing state's title to all lands on Willamette River lying between high and lowwater marks. O R S 41.310, 41.360(32);
Laws 1874, p. 76; Laws 1878, pp. 54, 55.
5. New Trial <&*2

The statute authorizing granting of
new trials applies only to law actions and
not to suits in equity. ORS 17.610(4).

Suit to quiet title to gravel bar in 6. Judgment <&=>342(l)
After expiration of term, circuit court
Willamette River.
The Circuit Court,
lackamas County, Ralph M. Holman, J., had no jurisdiction to vacate its decree
ntered a decree holding title to be in de- in quiet title suit unless it appeared from
mdant, and appeals were taken. The record that it had been without jurisdicupreme Court, Warner, J., held that tion to render judgment; its authority
ridence would not sustain plaintiffs' con- . after term time being limited to correction
ntion that land involved had not be^en of clerical or formal errors.
l island at low water during effective 7. New Trial <§^>99
iriod of statute relinquishing state's title
Newly discovered evidence is ground
• all lands on Willamette River lying for new trial in actions of law but has
:tween high and low water marks.
no application to suits in equity.
Affirmed.
John C. Caldwell, Oregon City, for
appellants.
On the briefs were Beattie,
In suit to quiet title to real property,
Hibbard
&
Caldwell,
Oregon City, George
lintiff must recover on strength of his
D.
LaRoche
and
White,
Sutherland &
m title and not on weakness of his adParks,
Portland.
rsary's title.
Quieting Title <^I0(I)

Quieting Title <©==>44(l)

In suit to quiet title to real property,
rden is on plaintiff to establish that he
s a perfect legal or equitable title,
^ardless of status of defendant's title.

Lloyd G. Hammel, Asst. Atty. Gen., for
respondent. With him on the brief was
Robert Y. Thornton, Atty. Gen.
Before PERRY, C. J., and LUSK,
WARNER and K E S T E R *, J J .

Quieting Title <&^44(l)

WARNER, Justice.
When pleadings in quiet title suit
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ce title in issue, plaintiff
has burden
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p_injriigr^sijyere entitled tcrthe full use
& •enjoyment of the land. The State of
taji^daimsjao^inte^
ifajssje,rt&4iojiter r t estj4^rill2Jl!S ) < §i a t e '
q provision of the Enabling Act or of
e ConsHtution7" "wTiicn provide that the
•oceeds from the sale of such lands shall
institute a trust fund is in any manner
lpinged—even by indirection—by upholdg plaintiff's title. It is difficult to see how
ider such circumstances the defendants
>uld claim that their failure to demand
le issuance of patent or the state's delay
L issuing it could defeat plaintiff's claim
• title by adverse possession by the bald
ssertion that such possession was adverse
> the state. The trial court did not err
i rejecting such contention.
The judgment below is therefore affirnv
1 Costs to respondent.
CROCKETT, W A D E , W O R T H E N , and
[ENRIOD, JJ., concur.
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AUTO LEASE COMPANY, a partnership, ^
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

CENTRAL MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., a
corporation, Defendant and
Respondent.
No. 8746.
Supreme Court of Utalu
May 13, 19S8.

Action by insured on policy to recover
or damage to automobile which it had purchased and which had been damaged while
*eing transported. The Third Judicial Disxict Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart M.
Sanson, J., rendered judgment for insurer
ind insured appealed. The Supreme Court,
Crockett, J., held that under policy insuring
ive of insured's automobiles and providing
r

that, if insured acquired ownersnip oi
another automobile and so notified company within 30 days following delivery,
policy applied to such automobile as of date
of such acquisition, if such automobile replaced an automobile described in policy,
insured was not entitled to recover for loss
of automobile which was intended to replace another automobile but which was lost
during delivery while automobile to be replaced was still in service.
Affirmed.
1. Judgment <§=>I78
Motion for summary judgment is in
effect a demurrer to contentions of adverse
party and states that, conceding facts to be
as claimed by adversary, there is no basis
for recovery.
A
2. Appeal and Error ®=^934(l)
On appeal, all aspects of case are considered in light most favorable to party
against whom motion for summary judgment was granted. 1
3. Insurance <§=* 146(3)
Rule that in case of uncertainty or ambiguity language of policy should be construed most strongly against insurer because it drew and issued policy has no application unless there is some genuine ambiguity or uncertainty in language upon
which reasonable minds may differ as to
the meaning, and that requirement is not
satisfied because a party may get a different
meaning by placing a forced or strained
construction on language. 2
4. Insurance <§=*I46(3)
Test to be applied in determining
whether there is an ambiguity in language
of insurance policy is whether meaning
would be plain to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing matter
fairly and reasonably, in accordance with
the usual and natural meaning of the words,
and in light of existing circumstances, including purpose of the policy, and if it
would be rule that ambiguity will be con-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2. Huber & Roland Const. Co. v. South

)oses for which they have been granted.
Counsel for respondent has no quarrel with
he contention that the state may not dispose
>f lands which were the subject of the rented grant in violation of the trust thereby
mposed, nor with the proposition that a
>ossessor may not hold adversely to the
tate with respect to such lands. Respondnt's contention is that under the facts of
tiis case no such issue is confronted.
In support of their position appellants rely
eavily upon certain Utah cases. Among
lem is the case of Van Wagoner v. Whitlore, 58 Utah 418, 199 P. 670, which it is
Dntended is determinative of the present
ise. We are not in accord with this conmtion.
In the Van Wagoner case, one Whitmore
ad been in open, notorious occupancy and
^ssession of the land in question, which
nds were subject to the same limitations
l alienability by the state as that here in)lved, since long prior to the date on which
e state of Utah was admitted to the Unn. He had enclosed the lands with a
nee and made other improvements. At
e time of the admission of the state of
tah to the Union it was provided by law
at one who was in possession of land
en given to the state by the Federal Govnment as grants in aid of schools could
ike application and exercise preference
^hts for acquisition of title. Whitmore
i not pursue this remedy. In 1912 one
m Wagoner entered into an agreement
purchase said lands from the state of
ah and was issued a certificate of sale.
tent was issued to him in June, 1916.
icreafter he commenced an action in
ictment against Whitmore, who by aner claimed title to the lands by adverse

possession. It is quite evident from the
statement of the facts that the adverse possession of Whitmore as against Van Wagoner did not commence until after the certificate of sale was issued in 1912. The
suit in ejectment was commenced early in
1918. Consequently the requisite period
of time, seven years, had not expired at the
time of the commencement of the action.
The question involved, therefore, was
whether or not Whitmore could hold adversely to the state of Utah. And that is
the sole question discussed in the opinion
of the court on that particular phase of the
case. The interest of the state in the land
was asserted by a complaint in intervention
by the state. Its contention and that of the
plaintiff was upheld by this court, such contention being that the predecessor section
to Section 78-12-2, U.C.A.1953 * could not
be applied against the state insofar as the
class of lands involved was concerned. It
was not a holding, as contended by appellant, to the effect that the statute of limitations could not run against a purchaser
from the state until after the issuance of
patent.
We have examined the other Utah cases
cited by the appellants in support of their
position. 2 It would unduly extend this opinion to enter into a discussion of them. Suffice i t j Q say that none of the cases involve
a
^iiillfliP n fiUrb-a<i w p h^ r p confront: that
during all of the time while the plaintiff
was in possession of the premises in question and l o r many years p r i o r t h e t e t o Ihe,
state, of Utah held the bare legal title,. j u nal payment_ofjhe amount_due the state had

that time the defendants or their predeces-

and profits of such real property, or
"Actions by the state.—The state will
some part thereof, within seven years."
not sue any person for or in respect to
any real property, or the issues or profits
2. Steele v. Boley, 7 Utah 64; Toltec
thereof, by reason of the right or title
Ranch v. Babcock, 24 Utah 183; Young
of the state to the same, unless:
v. Corless, 56 Utah 564, 191 P. 647;
"(1) Such right or title shall have acUtah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah
crued within seven years before any ac152 P.
178;
v. Thornley,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,165,
J. Reuben
Clark
LawLivingston
School, BYU.
tion or other proceeding for the same
74contain
Utah errors.
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ad executed and delivered an assignment
nd transfer of his interest in the land in
uestion. As noted above such assignment
nd transfer was not recorded in Beaver
bounty. Under the writ of execution the
heriff of Beaver County sold at Sheriff's
>ale the interest of Lewis in the real estate
[escribed in the Land Board certificate.
The sheriff's certificate of sale was issued
o Holmes on March 28, 1914. No redempion from such execution sale was ever
nade. The sheriff's certificate of sale of
"eal estate on execution was placed on record in the office of the Beaver County Reo r d e r on about the date of its execution,
^rom 1918 to 1940 the lands were, pursumt to statute, assessed in the name of the
*ecord owner, namely Gus S. Holmes.
Taxes assessed against the lands were not
3aid and they were sold to Beaver County
for nonpayment of taxes on January 2,
[937. Thereafter Beaver County foreclosed
its tax lien, and upon entry of a default
judgment sheriff's deed on foreclosure sale
was issued to Beaver County in 1941.

title to the lands in question as against each
and all of the defendants. A decree was
entered accordingly and the state of Utah
was directed to issue patent to the said
lands to plaintiff. It should be mentioned
at this point that the state of Utah was
joined as a party defendant in the quiet
title action of the plaintiff, and the Attorney %
General on behalf of the state of Utah answered that on March 30, 1914, the state
of Utah received final payment for the purchase of the land, and therefore the state
of Utah disclaimed any right, title or inter- t
est therein and stated that it stands ready,
willing and able to issue a patent to such
lands in accordance with the judgment of
the court.

In answering in the negative the que
tion posed at the outset of this opinion, tl
position of appellant may be stated as fo;
lows: The State Agricultural School lands
granted to the state by the federal government are held by the state in trust for the
people to be disposed of as may be provided
by law and relinquishment of title by the
Plaintiff purchased said property from state otherwise than by way of a sale and
Beaver County on contract approved June issuance of patent to a person other than a
5, 1941. Final payment was made on De- purchaser, his assignee or successor in in- f
cember 11, 1945. Ever since June 5, 1941, terest, is unconstitutional and void and in
the plaintiff has been in exclusive, open, contravention of the enabling act, the Utah
continuous, uninterrupted and adverse pos- State Constitution and the statutes pertainsession and occupancy of all of the said real ing to the administration, management and
property under claim of right and title sale of state lands. Counsel refers in supthereto, and has paid all the taxes regularly port of his contention to the provisions of
levied and assessed thereon according to the enabling act, approved July 16, 1894, 28
law. The defendants or their predecessors Stat. 107, which provides that the grant
in title have never at any time been seiied here involved is for the use of an agriculor in possession of any part of lands in tural college and subject to the restriction
controversy herein, nor received any part that all proceeds from the sale of said lands
of the rents, issues or profits from said are to constitute a permanent fund to be
lands.
safely invested and held by the state with
the income thereof to be used exclusively
The lower court held that by reason of
the purchase from Beaver County and by for the purposes of such college. Likewise
reason of plaintiff's adverse possession and invoked are the provisions of Sections 3 to
occupancy of the land and payment of all 7 inclusive of Article X, Sec. 3 of Article
taxes regularly levied and assessed thereon X I I I and Sec. 1 of Article XX of the Confor more than seven years subsequent to stitution of Utah, pursuant to the provisions
the final payment to the state of Utah on the of which all lands granted to the state by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
congress
are declared to be held in trust
contract to purchase from
the state and
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i land, and statutory and constitutional
rovisions that proceeds for sale of land
sued constitute a trust fund for colleges
ere not in any manner impinged by up>lding plaintiff's title.
Affirmed.

Averse Possession <§^7(3)

Failure of purchaser from state of
nd, which had been granted by federal
>vernment to state for use of agriculturcollege, and his successors in interest to
:mand issuance of patent or state's delay
issuing patent could not defeat claimLt's title to land by adverse possession
here state had received payment of purase price long before claimant's entry,
ite claimed no interest in land, and statory and constitutional provisions that proeds for sale of land issued constitute a
ist fund for colleges were not in any
inner impinged by upholding claimant's
le. Const, art. 10, §§ 3-7; art. 13, § 3 ;
t. 20, § 1; U.C.A.1953, § 7&-12-2.1

John S. Boyden, Allen H. Tibbals, Salt
.ke City, for appellants.
C. M. Gilmour, Clinton D. Vernon, Salt
ke City, for respondent.

MCDONOUGH,

chief justice.

chase price thereof, and was therefore entitled to a patent from the state, may a third
party by holding the land adversely to the
successors in interest of the purchaser for
the requisite period subsequent to the date
of final payment, but before issuance of
patent, quiet title thereto as against such
successors in interest of the purchaser?
The facts out of which this controversy
arises are these: The state of Utah was
granted by law the right to select certain
federal lands as grants in aid of the Agricultural College and to sell the land so
acquired. One Joseph Henshaw signed an
agreement to purchase selected lands on the
24th of November, 1902. The lands he
agreed to buy are the ones here in controversy. After approval by the United States
Land Office the state on January 1, 1905,
issued to Henshaw certificate of sale No.
8515.
Henshaw died in 1905 but prior to his
death he had assigned and transferred the
certificate of sale interest to one A. B.
Lewis. In ,1910, Lewis assigned and transferred the certificate to Lewisiana Land
Company, which company assigned and
transferred the certificate on August 21,
1914, to William Story, Jr., and Frederick
Steigmeyer, a co-partnership. Neither of
these assignments were recorded in the
Office of the County Recorder of Beaver
County, where the land is located. Appellants are the assignees and successors
in interest of the co-partnership. On March
30, 1914, the state of Utah received'the Jmal
p a r e n t s constituting payment in M L i p
tn
? . stajte^rTTtaE' of the sum due on_the
purchase of the land under the certificatejai.
sale. No patent to said lands ha&^^xJie^n..
issued by the state of Utah. _

The first question here confronted, the
swer to which we deem decisive of this
peal, may be stated as follows: Where
ids were granted to the state by the fedL1 government for use of the State Agritural College and subject to the restricri that all proceeds from the sale of said
ds are to constitute a permanent fund
be safely invested and held by the state,
One Gus S. Holmes, having acquired a
: income thereof to be used exclusively
money
judgment in Salt Lake County
• the purposes of such college; and where
against
Lewis,
procured to be issued a writ
tain of said lands were sold in the manof execution on March 4, 1914. This, it
• provided by law to a purchaser who
will be noted, was several years after Lewis
reafter paid to the state the full purVan Wagoner
v. Whitmore, 58 Utah
647; Utah
Copper
Co.
v. Eckman,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,P.J. Reuben
Clark Law
School,
BYU.
118, 199 P. 670; Steele v.Machine-generated
Boley, 7 Utah OCR, may
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165, 152 P. 178; Livingston v.

' of the other defendants is based on
. supplying Suhrmann with this prodThere may be a sharp conflict in the
ence as to such facts.
] The order complained of was made
notion of1 plaintiffs and opposed by the
mdants who initiated the intermediate
sal. Appellants contend (1) that such
solidation is contrary to the Constituk and statutory provisions of this State,
(2) that it would be highly prejudicial
iefendants. We conclude that the trial
rt's order was neither erroneous nor
reach of its discretion.
before considering defendants' claims
call attention to Rule 42 of Utah Rules
Civil Procedure. Subdivision (a) thereexpressly authorizes the trial court to
ier a joint hearing of common questions
law or fact arising from different ac>ns and to order such proceedings as
a.y tend to avoid unnecessary costs or
lay. Subdivision (b) authorizes the trial
•urt in furtherance of convenience or to
roid prejudice to order a separate trial
E any separate issue or any number of
sues. So, unless the trial court's order is
Dntrary to the Constitution or statutes of
lis State, or is likely to be prejudicial
D defendants, it was clearly within the disretion of the trial court to order a conolidation for trial of the issue of lia)ility in all of these cases.
(1) This order does not violate any constitutional or statutory provision. To support their contention contrary to this
statement defendants rely on Article I,
Section 7 of our Constitution that no "person shall be deprived of * * * property,
without due process of law"; also Article
I, Section 10, providing:
"In capital cases the right of trial
by jury shall remain inviolate. In
courts of general jurisdiction, except
in capital cases, a jury shall consist of
eight jurors. In courts of inferior
jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four
jurors. In criminal cases the verdict

a verdict. A jury m u v u ^ ~ _ _
be waived unless demanded."
From the details therein provided counsel
concludes that the legislature has no power
to change those provisions. We do not
disagree with this conclusion but we find
nothing in either Section 7 or 10 which is
not in complete harmony with the trial
court's order.
Counsel then refers to Section 78-21-1,
U.C.A.1953, as follows:
"In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property, with
or without damages, or for money
claimed as due upon contract or as
damages for breach of contract, or
for injuries, an issue of fact may be
tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is
waived or a reference is ordered."
and Section 78-21-2, U.C.A.1953, as follows:
u

All questions of fact, where the
trial is by jury, other than those mentioned in the next section, are to be
decided by the jury, and all evidence
thereon is to be addressed to them,
except when otherwise provided."
(Italics taken from appellants' brief.)
[2] Counsel claims that this statute,
since it uses the term "the jury," means
that one and the same jury must try all
issues in the case. This is obviously a
strained construction of that language.
That language simply means that all questions of fact are to be decided by the jury
impaneled to try such issues. It does not
consider or determine the question of
whether more than one jury may try different issues in a case. So, we conclude
that neither the Constitution nor these
statutes have any bearing on whether the
same jury must decide all issues of fact
in a given case.
s

(2) W e are also unable to see that the
consolidation of these cases for determination of liability only by one jury will be
prejudicial to the defendants. Certainly
a single determination of the question of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
liability
willerrors.
tend to save time and expense
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.wxx u^. a sudip connict
in the evidence on the facts which will be
determinative of liability.
Defendants' claim, that the consolidation
of the cases to determine liability only
will be prejudicial, is based on two propositions: (1) They claim that a jury which
determines liability only without assessing specific amounts of damages is more apt
to decide that question against them than
would a jury charged with a determination
of the amount of damages. (2) They claim
that if the same jury determines liability
and the amount of damages, the amount
of damages would probably be greatly reduced.

H E N R I O D , Justice.
I concur, but make the following obser
vation. The consolidation to determine lia
bility which was ordered at pre-trial, s<
far as I can determine from the record
was without any motion therefor having
been made by any of the parties. The
consolidation to determine liability nc
doubt was made to expedite matters and
save expense. I am wondering if expedition and saving of expense would not be
accomplished further if consolidation were
ordered to determine not only liability but
to determine damages, if liability were established. In such event, one jury could
handle all matters and it would save a
great deal of time and expense in impanelling eleven new and different juries.

We see no reason why a jury which determines only the question of liability would
be more apt to determine that question
against the defendants or either of them
than would a jury which also determined
the amount of damages. In fact, it is
sometimes claimed that a showing that
damages have been sustained appeals to
the emotions of the jury and causes little
or no consideration of the facts which
MINERSVILLE LAND & LIVESTOCK
create liability. In such case a jury which
COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
determines liability only would more carev.
fully consider the facts on which such lia- Earl P. S T A T E N , Administrator of the Estate of William Story, Jr., deceased, et
)ility is claimed than would a jury charged
,
31., Defendants and Appellants.
v
vith assessing the amount of damages also.
No. 8662.
The claim that a jury which heard all
he evidence on liability and damages would ^w ' 0 \ |*Supreme Court of Utah.
e likely to reduce the amount of damages Y
\ r
May 14, 1958.
1
> only well founded where a serious doubt
f liability causes a compromise verdict
Action to quiet title to land and for
n the amount of damages. Of course, the
order
directing state to issue patent to land.
sfendants are not entitled to. the benefit
The
Fifth
Judicial District Court, Beaver
I such a compromise verdict. They are
lly entitled to a separate fair considera- County, Will L. Hoyt, J., rendered judg)n of the issues of fact which are deter- ment for plaintiff, and defendants appealed.
inative of the question of liability and The Supreme Court, McDonough, C. J.,
e amount of damages. In either event held that failure of purchaser of land which
; cannot see that either plaintiffs or de- had been granted by federal government to ' •
state for use of agricultural college, and his
idants will be prejudiced by the order of
successors in interest to demand issuance ••/
nsolidatiQn made by the trial court.
Drder of the trial court is afrjrmed. of patent or state's delay in issuing patent
could not defeat plaintiff's title to land by
s.ts to respondents.
i?t
adverse possession where state had received
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